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ABSTRACT

Blunt, Janell R. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2015. Adaptive Memory:
Animacy and the Method of Loci. Major Professor: Jeffrey Karpicke.

A functionalist approach to cognition assumes that people’s minds are tuned to
process and remember information that benefits our survival or reproduction
(Nairne, 2005). One source of information with potentially high fitness value is
things that are alive and animate (Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada, Cogdill, &
LeBreton, 2013). The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the effects of
using an ancient mnemonic – the method of loci – to examine memory for
animate objects. Across four experiments, subjects used the method of loci to
remember a list of animate or inanimate objects. I manipulated animacy by
using animate or inanimate words (Experiments 1 and 4) or by using animate
or inanimate images (Experiments 2, 3, and 4). In Experiment 1, memory for
animate and inanimate words was tested in either the method of loci or a
pleasantness ratings control condition. Subjects learned a list of words; half of
the words were animate and the other half were inanimate. Subjects in both
conditions recalled more animate than inanimate words. The animacy effect in
the method of loci was smaller relative to the pleasantness condition.

viii
Experiments 2 and 3 were concerned with using imagery to manipulate
animacy. In Experiment 2, all subjects were given a list of inanimate words. In
the animate condition, subjects were told to imagine the object was alive
whereas in the inanimate condition, subjects were given no explicit instructions
concerning animacy. There was no animacy effect in this experiment. In
Experiment 3, subjects saw inanimate words paired with experimentergenerated descriptions of images, half of which were animate and half of which
were inanimate. Subjects recalled more words that were paired with animate
images than words that were paired with inanimate images, although this effect
was not statistically significant.
Experiment 4 used a combination of animate words and images to
examine the animacy effect. I factorially crossed word type (animate vs.
inanimate) with image type (animate vs. inanimate) to explore the effect of
adding animate and inanimate images to inanimate and inanimate words.
There were main effects of word type and image type such that animate words
were recalled more than inanimate words (as in Experiment 1) and words
associated with animate images were recalled more than words associated
with inanimate images (as in Experiment 3). Overall, the results of these four
experiments suggest that the animacy effects persist in the method of loci.
These results contribute to a growing body of evidence that suggest that
animacy is a potent variable in memory.

1

INTRODUCION

Adaptive Cognition and Memory
A functionalist approach to cognition assumes that cognitive processes
are tuned to solve adaptive problems that benefit survival or reproduction.
Nature “selects” one physical design over another because that design has
fitness value – it helps the organism solve an adaptive problem that in turn
increases the chances that the organism will pass the genetic material down to
the next generation. In biology the heart is uniquely designed to pump blood,
and the kidneys to filter impurities. In the same way, it is likely that nature has
shaped the design and function of our cognitive systems (Tooby & Cosmides,
1992). From this perspective it logically follows that our memory system, like
our heart and lungs, is also “tuned” to remember things that enhance our
fitness (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002; Nairne, 2005; Nairne 2014;
Sherry & Schacter, 1987).
In a foundational paper concerned with adaptive memory, Nairne,
Thompson, & Pandeirada (2007) offered a functional account of memory that
suggested our ability to remember evolved to solve adaptive problems. That is,
our memory systems are likely specifically tuned to process information that is
relevant to survival. In a typical survival processing paradigm, originally
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developed by Nairne et al. (2007), subjects process words in an ancestral
survival scenario (e.g., “Rate how relevant each of these words would be for
your survival if you were stranded in the grassland of a foreign land”) compared
to other scenarios (e.g., “Rate how relevant each of these words would be if
you were moving to a foreign land”). On a surprise memory test, subjects recall
more words that are processed for survival than words that are processed for
their relevance to moving (Nairne, et al., 2007; D. J. Burns, Hart, Griffith, & A.
D. Burns, 2013), planning a vacation at a resort (Nairne, Pandeirada, &
Thompson, 2008; D. J. Burns et al., 2013), or planning a bank heist (Kang,
McDermott & Cohen, 2008). Survival processing also produces superior
memory than other conditions that are widely accepted as having great
mnemonic relevance such as rating words for their pleasantness, imagery or
self-reference (Nairne et al., 2008). The effect has also been found using
pictures (Otgaar, Smeets, & Van Bergen, 2010). The purpose of this
dissertation is to examine the mnemonic value of objects with a potentially high
survival value: living (animate) things.
Animacy
Intuitively, it seems as though living things have a special priority in our
day-to-day lives. We see faces in the clouds and a man in the moon; our
instinct tells us that the thing that goes bump in the night is a predator. We
anthropomorphize – attribute human-like characteristics to non-human objects
– easily and frequently. Upon coming home, I interpret my dog’s reaction as
happiness to see me; it looks as if he pulls back his lips and smiles at me.
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Children’s media is ripe with examples of the priority of animates. Some of
baby’s first books teach the sounds animals make and the feel of their fur.
Some of the most popular and timeless children’s books involve objects or
animals that are anthropomorphized, including Where the Wild Things Are
(Sendak, 1963), The Very Hungry Caterpillar (Carle, 1969), Charlotte’s Web
(White, 1952), Goodnight Moon (1947), The Little Engine that Could (Piper,
1930), and Thomas the Tank Engine from The Railway Series (Awdry, 1972).
Similarly, many children’s movies have a host of objects that have taken on
human characteristics such as The Brave Little Toaster (Reese, 2003), the
dancing brooms in Fantasia (Sharpsteen & Disney, 1940), and the whole crew
from Disney’s Beauty and the Beast (1991) including Mrs. Pots, Chip, Lumier,
and Cogsworth to name a few. Animates are everywhere, whether or not we
are intentionally looking for them.
What is Animacy?
These everyday examples converge with decades of research that
suggest we do in fact conceptualize living things differently from non-living
things. According to the folk biology literature, there is a ubiquitous taxonomic
system in which living things are classified and categorized in a way that
objects are not (Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973, 1974; Medin & Atran, 2004).
The classification of living things is typically further divided into additional
categories, and these categories often fall into a hierarchy (e.g., humans at the
top followed by animals then plants). However, there is often ambiguity
surrounding the middle sections of this hierarchy. People from virtually all
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cultures agree that humans are in a separate category from plants, but the
distinction between humans and animals is less clear. Before ages 10 or 11,
children typically classify humans as a unique category that is separate from
both plants and animals. However, around this age children begin to categorize
humans as a type of animal and therefore begin to group humans and animals
in the same category (Carey, 1985). Modern American children are not the only
people to make a similar human-animal distinction. The separation between
humans and other animals dates as far back as pre-Socratic Greece. In this
system, living things were classified as either human-like (biology) or
nonhuman-like (zoology). Yet in both systems, living plants fall into a category
that is distinctively separate from animals and humans (Dellantonio,
Innamorati, & Pastore, 2012). While plants are most certainly living things, they
do not enjoy the same special cognitive priority as other living things and have
been wrongly categorized by children as nonliving things (Hatano et al., 1993).
There is a critical feature absent in most plants that is present in animals and
humans. That feature is animacy.
To use an overly simplistic classification scheme, a living thing is
animate if it can move on its own and has intentions or goals. A definition of
animacy has been conspicuously absent in this manuscript until now because,
much like the ambiguity surrounding the perception of living and nonliving
things, the line between what is animate and what is not can also be unclear. It
is often the case that the animate/inanimate distinction parallels the
living/nonliving distinction, although this is not always true. It is easy to come
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up with examples of objects that defy this sort of simple living/nonliving
definition of animacy. The first obvious example mentioned previously is plants.
Perhaps plants are uniformly classified differently from other living things (and
even considered “nonliving” by children) because plants lack the primary
indicators of animacy. This idea is captured in the definition of the word as
found in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. The word “animate” is defined along
the living/nonliving dimension (definitions 1, 2, and 4); “possessing or
characterized by life,” “full of life,” and “referring to a living thing,” but also a
distinction is made between plant and animal life in an alternative definition
(definition 3); “of or relating to animate life as opposed to plant life”.
To further cloud the already murky conceptualization of animacy, I will
argue that it is unclear whether the status of “living” is actually a necessary
feature of animacy. Consider a goat that is dead. In this case, the goat shares
almost all of the features of a living goat with the exception that it is no longer
alive. It seems that this goat no longer is animate. On the other hand, a
vampire is also not living, yet shares almost all of the features of other animate,
human-like beings. In this case, it would seem as though a vampire is animate.
However, at this point these are all speculations because there is no hard line
drawn between what is animate and what is inanimate. For the sake of the
current dissertation, I am concerned with things that would be important to
notice and remember because of their fitness value. It seems that noticing and
remembering things that have goals and the ability to act on those goals would
provide an advantage to survival relative to things that do not.
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The ambiguity surrounding what is animate and what is not may stem
from the fact that researchers from across the various fields of psychology
have yet to agree upon a unified classification system for separating these two
things. Fortunately, that is not to say that we are left empty-handed in this
question to understand animacy. There are many characteristics that are used
to inform people’s perception of animacy. The majority of these characteristics
fall primarily into two classes: static/featural and dynamic. There are also other
characteristics that do not fall neatly into a static or dynamic classification, such
as using empathy to determine how similar an object is to oneself (Langacker,
1991). However, the static/dynamic dichotomy is a useful way to consider
animate characteristics.
The static characteristics of animacy are based on unchanging features
of an object such as the look or feel of the object. The most reliable static cue
for animacy is the presence of a face. Other static features include the
presence of legs (as opposed to wheels), skin or fur, sounds, and smells. The
categories of static and dynamic characteristics are not mutually exclusive as
in the case of a person’s static – but also dynamic – gaze (Gao, McCarthy, &
Scholl, 2010; Opfer & Gelman, 2011). Often these static clues overlap with
characteristics of living things (e.g. a table has legs) and therefore may be
good indicators of animacy in combination with other dynamic cues.
Perhaps the most reliable signal of animacy comes from dynamic cues
that are based on motion. Animate objects have self-generated and selfsustained movement such as walking or crawling (Opfer & Gelman, 2011). This
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type of motion is different from other types of Newtonian motions because
there is no other external source for the start of the motion (such as an object
that is falling because of gravity). This movement must also be biologically
plausible such as the pattern of motion inferred from lights that are placed on
joints in point light walker displays (Johansson, 1973). A third dynamic
characteristic is the perception of goal-directed movement, such as a pattern of
movement that can be interpreted as an animal searching for dinner or
avoiding becoming another animal’s dinner. This ability to differentiate goaldirected movement from other movement starts as early as 3 months (Luo,
2011). Similarly, another characteristic is that animates have contingent
behaviors that are related in time to another action (Gergely & Watson, 1999)
Examples of these cause-and-effect behaviors might include smiling after
receiving a compliment, crying because something sad has happened, or
taking an alternative route because an obstacle has been placed in the
originally intended route. The majority of images described in this dissertation
are based on dynamic actions.
Detecting Animates
There is ample evidence suggesting that people respond differently to
animates and inanimates beginning at an early age. There are special ways
people in every society think about living things, including tracking the
movement of other humans (e.g., recognizing human faces; Carey & Diamond,
1977; Diamond & Carey, 1986). People have developed specific grammar
rules and semantic structures for pronouns and proper names (Arnold,
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Eisenband, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2000). Infants as young as 6.5
months old attribute goals to moving shapes. For example, infants pay special
attention to a circle that moves around a rectangle to reach another circle
relative to a circle that takes the same trajectory without the rectangle (Csibra,
Gergely, Bıŕ ó, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999). At 12 months, infants associate
ordered movement with animate objects and disordered, random movement
with inanimate objects (Newman, Keil, Kuhlmeier, & Wynn, 2010). By four
years old, children are able to predict and explain whether unfamiliar objects
are animate or not (Gelman, 1990). At this age children are also able to
differentiate between things that are dead versus sleeping, despite the shared
perceptual features (Barrett & Behne, 2005).
This differential treatment of animate objects makes sense from an
adaptive memory perspective. If survival depended on rapidly detecting nearby
predators, it would be advantageous to have a cognitive system that quickly
and easily detected living things with goals and intentions (i.e., animate things).
People are thought to have a specialized animacy detection device to
determine whether something is alive or is the result of a living thing (J. L.
Barrett, 2004). Often this animacy detection device responds quickly and
automatically. In change-detection scenarios, people are substantially faster at
detecting changes that involve animals relative to other categories of inanimate
objects (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). People are easily able to detect
animacy (even the gender of a walker) with only sparse inputs of information in
the form of lights placed strategically on various joints on the body (Johansson,
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1973). Our detection device is hypersensitive to animate objects, frequently
ascribing animacy to a situation when there is none. For this reason, our
detection system is often thought of as a hyperactive agency detection device
(H. C. Barrett, 2005; J. L. Barrett, 2004; Tipper & Weaver, 1998). From an
evolutionary perspective, it is more advantageous for a person to detect an
animate when there is none than it is to fail to detect an animate, especially a
harmful or dangerous one (J. L. Barrett, 2004). A person who mistakenly
perceives rustling in the grass to be a poisonous snake when in reality it is the
wind is more likely to survive than a person who mistakenly perceives the
rustling of a snake to be the wind.
This hyperactive agency detection device perceives animacy in unlikely
situations. In a classic paper, Heider and Simmel (1944) showed a brief film in
which two triangles and a circle moved around the screen in what appeared to
be an ordered, intentional manner. Despite the fact that these were simple,
geometric shapes that moved silently around the screen, subjects were quick
to attribute intentions and goals to the shapes. Almost all of the subjects
produced elaborate stories about the shapes such as a romantic tale about an
intricate love triangle complete with character profiles for each shape including
fearful, frustrated, and aggressive.
However, not all movement is automatically perceived as animate.
Whether or not geometric shapes are perceived as animate depends on the
pattern of the movement. In a visual search task, Abrams and Christ (2006)
demonstrated that it was the start of motion (i.e., an object that has just begun
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to move), not motion per se, that captured attention. Furthermore, motion onset
is only predictive of animacy if there is no physical explanation. To borrow an
example from Scholl and Tremoulet (2000), imagine square “A” moves in a
straight line towards square “B.” In one scenario, once “A” reaches “B,” “A”
stops moving, and “B” starts moving along the same path. In the other
scenario, once “A” has almost reached “B,” “B” moves quickly away from “A” in
a random direction until it is a few inches away from “A.” “A” then changes
course and moves in the new direction towards “B.” Both cases are examples
of motion onset of geometric shapes, but the two scenarios are perceived
differently. In the first scenario “A” is seen as the cause for “B”s movement
according to the properties of physics, but in the second scenario the squares
become alive with potential intentional states or goals (e.g., “A” wants to catch
“B”, or “B” is trying to escape from “A”). If an object begins to move with no
other explanation than an internal energy source, this object is self-propelled.
As mentioned earlier, this ability is a key characteristic of animate objects.
Similarly, objects that move randomly and without clear goals (a characteristic
of animate objects) capture people’s attention faster than objects that move
predictably, as if colliding into one another (Pratt, Radulescu, Guo, & Abrams,
2010).
Remembering Animates
Given the information available about the importance of animacy on a
perceptual level, it is reasonable to expect that our memory systems, like our
perceptual systems, are tuned to remember animate things. In perhaps one of
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the first, albeit unintentional, studies to demonstrate the mnemonic value of
animacy, Camilleri, Kuhlmeier, and Chu (2010) used geometric shapes to
examine the role of intentionality in helping and hindering behavior. Subjects
viewed movies of various colored triangles in which the triangles were either
perceived as “helping” a red ball up a slope, or hindering the ball’s progress.
Importantly, the movement of the triangle could be perceived as intentional
(e.g., moving on its own accord) or unintentional (e.g., falling because of
gravity). Although animacy was not a dimension of interest to the authors, on a
later test subjects recognized the correct color of triangle more often when the
triangle’s motion was perceived as intentional rather than unintentional.
Recently, the mnemonic value of animate objects has been directly
examined with animate and inanimate stimuli. Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada,
Cogdill, & LeBreton (2013) had subjects study a list of animate and inanimate
words (e.g., “duck” versus “kite”) that were equated along a number of
mnemonic-relevant dimensions. Across repeated free recall tests, subjects
remembered more animate than inanimate words. In the current dissertation, I
will use a modified version of this animate and inanimate word list to examine
the mnemonic value of animate objects within the context of the method of loci.
In addition, when Rubin and Friendly’s (1986) collection of recall norms were
subjected to a multiple regression analysis, animacy was an important
predictor of recall. Animacy was actually ranked as high as the three variables
Rubin and Friendly reported were the largest determinants of memory:
imagery, availability, and emotionality. Bonin, Gelin, and Bugaiska (2014)
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extended the animacy effect using pictures (Experiment 1), an incidental
learning task (Experiment 2) and a final recognition test (Experiment 3).
The mnemonic value of animacy has also been demonstrated by
attributing animate characteristics to non-words. In this way, subjects were
exposed to the same stimuli but were asked to process the stimuli differently.
VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, and Blunt (2013) attributed characteristics to
non-words that were either typically associated with animate objects (e.g. “cries
when upset”) or with inanimate objects (e.g., “assembled with screws”). On
final free recall and recognition tests, non-words that were paired with animate
characteristics were recalled and recognized more than non-words that were
paired with inanimate characteristics. In the current dissertation, I used a
similar method to attribute animate and inanimate characteristics to objects.
Animacy effects have recently been found for animate stimuli in a paired
associate task (VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Cogdill, 2015). Animate and
inanimate words were randomly paired with Swahili words. Subjects were told
to learn the English word associated with each Swahili word (essentially, a
foreign language learning paradigm). On a final cued recall test, subjects
recalled more of the animate words than inanimate words. However, there may
be situations in which animacy effects are not found in paired associate
learning. This is the case for paired-associate learning with emotional arousing
stimuli (Madan, Caplan, Lau & Fujiware, 2012). In this situation, there is a
memory advantage for the individual negative valence words at the cost of the
associated words. Perhaps there could be similar situations in which animate
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words are remembered at the cost of remembering the item associated with
the animate object. Research from the perception literature has demonstrated
that animates capture attention; therefore, it is possible that during paired
associate learning, animate words may capture attention and therefore receive
more processing than inanimate words. If this is the case there might be an
advantage for animate words on a free recall test but not on a cued recall test.
It is possible, then, that the animacy effect may not appear in an ordered
output task. Animate words may increase the specific memory for that item at
the cost of information about that item’s order. That is, memory for the
individual animate items may be greater for animate words, but this memory for
the individual items may impair the memory for serial order. This type of
dissociation for item and order memory has been demonstrated with the
generation effect. Across three experiments, subjects completed word
fragments aloud of some words (the generation condition) and simply read
aloud the others (the read only condition). As is typically the case (see
Slamecka & Graf, 1978), generating the words improved the memory for the
individual items. However, generating the words impaired memory for the order
of those words as measured by order reconstruction tasks and input-output
correspondence measures of recall (Nairne, Riegler, & Serra, 1991). In the
present experiments, the effect of animacy was tested in an ordered output
task. This ordered output task was the method of loci.
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Method of Loci
What is the method of loci? In the popular British Broadcasting
Corporation television series based off of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s classic
stories, “Sherlock Holmes”, Dr. Stapleton asks the same question when
Sherlock Holmes mentally retreats to his “mind palace.” Holmes’s sidekick,
Watson, explains:
DR. JOHN WATSON: It's a memory technique, a sort of mental
map. You plot a...a map with a location - it doesn't have to
be a real place - and then you deposit memories there
that...theoretically, you can never forget anything. All you
have to do is find your way back to it.
DR. STAPLETON: So this imaginary location could be anything a house, a street...?
DR. JOHN WATSON: Yeah.
DR. STAPLETON: It's a palace. He said it was a palace.
DR. JOHN WATSON: Yeah, well, he would, wouldn't he?
(Gatiss, Moffat, & Doyle, 2012, 1:10:05)
Not only would Sherlock Holmes choose to call his set of internal
location cues a palace, but so would many others after him, including many top
memory athletes. But before I get into the details about how memory athletes
use the method – and what the existent literature says about it – or why it is
particularly well-suited for the present study of animacy, I will first provide an
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accurate explanation of the technique (You were on the right track, Watson!)
and provide a brief history.
To use the method of loci, a person creates images of to-beremembered items and then mentally places these images in distinguishable
locations along a path, often in a building such as a house (or, in Holmes’s
case, a palace). To recall the items, the person mentally retraces his/her steps
along the path and virtually “looks” at each location to identify the items that
were previously placed there. This technique is not new to the 2012 television
show, nor was it new in 1902 at the time when Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
published the story quoted above, The Hound of the Baskervilles.
A Brief History of the Method of Loci
Legend traces the origins of the method of loci to as early as 500 B.C.E
at a banquet given by a nobleman in Ancient Greece. (Yates, 1966). The
nobleman hired Simonides of Ceos to deliver a poem in his honor at the
banquet, but Simonedes dedicated only half of the poem to honoring the host
and the other half to honoring the twin gods, Castor and Pollux. When the
nobleman heard the poem, he was enraged that he received only half of the
honor and praise he expected and refused to pay Simonides the agreed upon
price. Instead, the nobleman offered only half of the payment and insisted
Simonides ask Castor and Pollux for the rest of the payment. Soon after, a
messenger informed Simonides that two men, later assumed to be Castor and
Pollux, were waiting to see him outside of the banquet hall. While Simonides
was outside waiting for the two men, an earthquake struck, destroying the
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banquet hall and killing all the attendees inside the ruins. The damage from the
earthquake left the guests unidentifiable even to their family members. To
recall who was there for the burials, Simonides imagined the seating
arrangement of the guests at the banquet hall. He then mentally walked
through the former banquet hall and identified every guest who had attended.
But Simonides did not stop there. He realized that this technique could be used
to remember other things besides guests, perhaps famous poets, objects, or
even poems. And so the method of loci was born (and beware he who dare
cross the gods! Cicero 55 B.C.E./1970).
Before external mnemonic devices such as paper or the latest iPhone
were readily available, memory was considered to be a critical component of
speech. As such, the techniques of remembering were included in every school
of rhetoric (Yates, 1966). There are three surviving Latin sources that
described this often-called “art of memory” for the aspiring student of rhetoric.
The earliest and most informative text, Rhetorica ad Herennium, was written
around 90 B.C.E. and does not bear the name of the author, only that it was a
treatise on rhetoric for a man named Herennius. This anonymous manuscript is
the source for the majority of surviving information about how to use the
method of loci and was likely the gold-standard of mnemonics in the ancient
world. In it the author distinguishes between two types of memory: natural
memory and artificial memory – a distinction that remains today (Worthen &
Hunt, 2011). Despite two thousand years, the techniques laid out in this book
are still largely unchanged, to such an extent that world memory champion Ed
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Cooke said of it, “This book is our bible” (Foer, 2011, p. 93). The two later
works, Cicero’s 55 B.C.E. De Oratore and Quintilian’s 95 C.E. Instituto de
Oratoria, likely assumed readers were familiar with this book (Yates, 1966) and
consist of related information (e.g., the origins story described above from de
Oratore and Quintillian’s opinion that the method seems rather artificial and
unhelpful from Instituo de Oratoria). For these reasons, Ad Herennium will be
the primary ancient source referenced in this manuscript.
By the Middle Ages, the method of loci had fallen out of favor and was
replaced with other mnemonics such as the linking-by-story method and
general organizational strategies. With the exception of the Puritans, who
considered the often off-color use of imagery idolatrous, the method of loci
enjoyed another period of popularity during the Renaissance. Several notable
individuals who used the method of loci during this time were Peter of Ravenna
and Matteo Ricci. Peter of Ravenna (c. 1448-1508) was a lawyer who is best
known for his book, Phoenix seu artificiosa memoria, in which he described his
extensive use of mnemonic techniques like the method of loci (Yates, 1966).
Later, the Italian Matteo Ricci (c. 1582–1610) reported using hundreds of
churches to hold items in memory during his time as a Jesuit missionary in
China. His book is called, A Treatise on Mnemonics and is described in the
book The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci (Spence, 1985). Worthen and Hunt
(2011) speculate that the method of loci, and mnemonics in general, fell out of
favor after Ebbinghaus’s 1885 monograph which was concerned with “natural”
memory. Five years later, however, William James acknowledges in his
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foundational 1890 book, Principles of Psychology, the benefits of using
mnemonic techniques.
Currently, universities no longer focus on rhetoric or memorization,
choosing instead to emphasize complex learning and application skills such as
logic and critical analysis. The method of loci is now often reduced to just a
gimmicky party trick (Worthen & Hunt, 2011). However, the appearance of the
method of loci in popular media outlets (including Joshua Foer’s Moonwalking
with Einstein and the BBC’s Sherlock) has once again aroused some curiosity
about the method. Joshua Foer’s book provides detailed descriptions of the
techniques used by several successful memory champions. For that reason, it
will be frequently cited throughout the section about recommendations.
Today, the method of loci is one of the most popular mnemonic
techniques used by memory athletes around the world. Last year, 169 people
with quite ordinary memory abilities gathered at Haikou, China to compete in a
variety of memory competitions. There, these ordinary people accomplished
quite extraordinary feats of memory, memorizing in minutes what most of us
would only dream of memorizing in weeks or months. According to the World
Memory Championship website, notable contestants of last year’s competition
include 11-year-old Chen Zeqi who memorized 15 decks of playing cards in
one hour and 2014 World Memory Champion Jonas von Essen who
memorized 95 random words in 5 minutes and 106 historic dates in 5 minutes
(World Memory Statistics, 2015). How did Jonas von Essen and Chen Zeqi
memorize so many things in so little time? By now it is probably obvious what
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the answer, or at least part of the answer, is: They used a memory palace. It is
important to realize that these memory athletes like Moonwalking with Einstein
author, Joshua Foer, are not savants born with superior memory abilities.
Rather, these are people who have spent hours training to use certain
mnemonic techniques like the method of loci. In a recent article aimed at
exploring 10 people with extraordinary memory abilities, 9 of the 10 reported
using the method of loci (Maguire, Valentine, Widing & Kapur, 2003). Below I
will describe recommendations advocated by method of loci experts from both
over 2000 years ago and present day; the surprising reality is that the method
has changed little since its inception. I will then examine these
recommendations through the lenses of a cognitive psychologist and discuss
empirical evidence in favor of or against these various recommendations.
How to Build a Memory Palace
Memory athletes such as Joshua Foer and Ed Cooke recommend
several techniques to increase the effectiveness of the method of loci. The
majority of these recommendations were originally described in the Latin
sources, Ad Herennium in particular (Foer, 2011). There is not much in the way
of empirical evidence that any of these recommendations actually enhance the
mnemonic value of the method, although several recommendations capitalize
on well-established processes known to improve memory in the cognitive
sciences, in particular organization and distinctiveness (Worthen & Hunt,
2008).
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A basic component and recommendation of the method of loci is to
create images. This recommendation is likely for a good reason. Within
cognitive psychology, it is widely accepted that people have an impressive
ability to remember images (Crowder, 1976; Paivio & Csapo, 1973). In a twochoice forced recognition test of 68 items, subjects recognized 88.4% of the
words, and 96.0% of the pictures (Shepard, 1967). Across 8 hours, Standing,
Conezio, and Haber (1970), showed subjects 2560 pictures of family vacations,
which included people, cities, and vegetation. On a two-choice recognition test
of a sample of 280 of the original pictures, subjects correctly identified about
90% of the pictures. Another group of subjects who viewed 1000 extra pictures
scored similarly. People have an impressive ability to recognize images,
although these experiments say nothing of a person’s ability to recall those
images.
In addition to recalling images, the process of creating images has
played an important role in memory throughout the history of experimental
psychology (Paivio, 1969). As early as 1937, Fernberger described a
procedure similar to the peg-word method in which words that rhyme with
numbers are used as a framework to organize to-be-remembered items. In this
method, an interactive image of the to-be-remembered word is formed with a
peg-word. In one of the earliest demonstrations of imagery in modern
experimental psychology, Miller, Galanter & Pribram (1960) used a list of 10
peg-words that rhymed with the numerals 1 through 10 (bun, shoe, tree, door,
hive, sticks, heaven, gate, wine, and hen). Several years later, Bugelski, Kidd,
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and Segmen (1968) provided one of the first controlled experiments of the pegword mnemonic and demonstrated that images can serve as mediators in
memory. Subjects created their own images and followed a strict recall strategy
during retrieval, much like subjects do when using the method of loci. On these
associate recall tasks, it was important whether the to-be-remembered word
and peg-word interacted: When people were given instructions to form an
interactive image of word pairs, recall performance was much higher both on
immediate and delayed tests relative to control subjects who used rote
repetition (Bower, 1972; see also Wollen, Weber, & Lower, 1972). Therefore
another recommendation from cognitive psychology may be that the method of
loci may be most effective when images are created in which objects and
locations interact. Many examples given by memory athletes include examples
of the to-be-remembered word interacting with the location (Roediger & Dellis,
2014).
Some memory athletes further believe that images rich in sensory
features may be more memorable than less descriptive images. A mental
image of a cat noisily eating or old and smelly gym socks are thought to be
more memorable than only the image of a cat or pair of socks (Bower, 1970;
Foer, 2011). Images are also thought to be more memorable if they are funny
(Foer, 2011), colorful (Bower, 1970), or sad (Roediger & Dellis, 2014). It is
possible that creating richer images is a form of elaboration which could lead to
higher levels of recall.
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Memory champions advise people who use the method of loci to create
images that are distinct (Worthen & Hunt, 2011; Foer, 2011). The author of Ad
Herennium provided the example that sunrises and sunsets, unlike solar
eclipses, are unexceptional – and therefore unmemorable – because they
occur so often. Memory champion Ed Cooke explained, “The general idea … is
to change whatever boring thing is being inputted into your memory into
something that is so colorful, so exciting, and so different from anything you’ve
seen before that you can’t possibly forget it” (Foer, 2011 p.99). There is no
direct test of this advice within the method of loci, but it is not a stretch to
imagine that distinct images would be recalled more than images that are not
distinct. Distinctiveness has played a role in cognition since von Restorff’s
(1933) experiments in which unique items were recalled more than the
remaining items, and distinctiveness has continued to play a key role in many
views of memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Hunt & Einstein, 1981; Hunt &
McDaniel, 1993; Nairne, 2006). On the other hand, the improved memory for
the distinct items may hurt the recall of the remaining items, resulting in no
overall change in memory for the entire list. To take it a step further, there
could be improved memory for the items but worse memory for order, as is the
case with the item-order dissociation seen in the generation effect (Nairne et
al., 1991). This impaired order information may be particularly detrimental in
the method of loci because the method’s mnemonic benefits are driven largely
in part from the availability of the encoding order during retrieval.
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Other recommendations have potential adaptive underpinnings such as
creating images that are sexual, animate, or disgusting. Following the advice
established in Ad Herennium, Joshua Foer recommended creating images that
are sexual such as an image of Claudia Schiffer swimming in cottage cheese
naked (Foer, 2011). Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci also acknowledged using
lewd imagery in his memory palaces (Spencer, 1985). It is reasonable to
expect, from a functional memory perspective, that sexual images could be
remembered well because of their mating cues (Ryan & Jetha, 2010). The next
recommendation is directly related to the topic of this dissertation: Animate
images are thought to produce a mnemonic advantage over inanimate images.
Joshua Foer wrote of the advice given to him by his memory coach, Ed Cooke:
“‘Now, anthropomorphizing the bottles of wine is quite a good idea,’ Ed
suggested. ‘Animate images tend to be more memorable than inanimate
images.’ That advice, too, came from the Ad Herennium.” (Foer, 2011, p. 101).
Motion is also thought to enhance the memorability of images, although
whether it is motion per se or motion onset (a featural cue for animacy, as
discuss earlier) was not described. An example of giving motion to images is
hot dogs rolling down the driveway (Bower, 1970). Perhaps the driveway in
Bower’s mind was slanted and the hot dogs were merely following the laws of
gravity. But perhaps the hotdogs were moving of their own accord, maybe
rolling to get off the driveway. Bower does not specify. Disfigured images are
also advised such as ripe tomatoes splattered on the front door (Bower, 1970)
or tomato sauce on a pizza that is made out of rat blood (Roediger & Dellis,
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2014). Perhaps these people have unknowingly stumbled across another
potentially adaptive feature of memory: Enhanced memory for things that are
potentially harmful due to risk of contagion from a disease or illness.
Perhaps the most popular recommendation is to create images that are
bizarre. It may also be the recommendation about which cognitive psychology
has the most to say. The idea that, when using the method of loci, images
should be bizarre is as old as the method itself. It has been advocated by
ancient Romans (Ad Herennium), memory champions (Foer, 2011; Roediger &
Dellis, 2014), modern self-help authors (Lorayne & Lucas, 2012), and
educators (Tess, Hutchinson, Treloar, & Junkins, 1999). The mnemonic value
of bizarre imagery is not intuitive and was a source of considerable debate
among experimental psychologists for decades.
Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding the
conditions under which bizarre images are more memorable than ordinary
images. When bizarreness first captured the attention of memory researchers,
it was assumed that bizarre images were more memorable than ordinary
images (e.g., Roth, 1961). However, in an experiment examining recall of word
pairs, Wollen et al. (1972) called into question this pervasive assumption.
Wollen et al. (1972) demonstrated that it was not bizarreness per se that
enhanced recall, but rather it was the interaction of the two word pairs. For
example, to remember the word pair “piano-cigar”, the bizarre image of the
piano smoking the cigar was equally memorable as the ordinary image of the
cigar resting on the piano. They proposed that creating an interaction of the
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two words often lead people to create bizarre images (such as the piano
smoking the cigar), which lead to the superstition that it was bizarreness, rather
than interactivity, that improved memory for those pairs. (As an aside, it would
also be interesting to further examine these interactive images for another
potential confound: animacy. The words could be examined individually to see
if bizarre images that are animate, such as the piano smoking the cigar, are
more memorable than bizarre images that are inanimate, such as a cigar
burning at both ends). By the late 1970s, bizarre imagery was generally
considered to provide no extra mnemonic advantage (Crowder, 1976;
Postman, 1975). However, the case against the mnemonic value of bizarre
imagery was not closed. Shortly after Crowder’s and Postman’s remarks,
several demonstrations of the mnemonic advantages of bizarre imagery
reappeared (Merry, 1980; Webber & Marshall, 1978; Wollen & Cox, 1981a,
1981b). By the mid-1980s the literature was ripe with evidence supporting both
viewpoints.
A decade after Postman’s and Crowder’s seemingly conclusive
statements, McDaniel and Einstein (1986) demonstrated across five
experiments that bizarre images may be more memorable than ordinary
images but only under certain conditions. In their incidental learning tasks,
subjects were asked to rate the vividness of mental images created for three
underlined words that were embedded in sentences. The context of the
sentence was either bizarre (e.g., “The dog rode the bicycle down the street.”)
or ordinary (e.g., “The dog chased the bicycle down the street.”) On a surprise
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recall test, subjects recalled more words from sentences from bizarre contexts
than words from ordinary contexts, but only when the list of sentences
contained both bizarre and ordinary sentences (that is, a mixed design). The
bizarreness effect occurred when the initial imagery task was self-paced or
experimenter-paced, but did not appear on a recognition test. Kroll and Tu
(1988) found a similar pattern of results on both an immediate and delayed
recall test: Across six experiments, bizarre imagery improved memory only in a
mixed list design. Many others have since found similar bizarreness effects in
which bizarreness only improves memory in mixed list designs (Campos,
Gómez-Juncal, & Pérez-Fabello, 2008; Macklin & McDaniel, 2005; McDaniel,
Einstein, DeLosh, May & Brady, 1995). McDaniel and Einstein (1986) proposed
the now largely accepted idea that bizarre imagery enhances memory in mixed
lists designs because bizarre images are more distinct.
This prevailing explanation of the bizarreness effect is that bizarre
images are easier to access but once accessed fail to provide a boost in the
recovery of the information within that image. In McDaniel and Einstein’s
(1986) experiments, this meant that the bizarre contexts were recalled more
than the ordinary contexts, but the individual words within the sentence were
not recalled more. Kroll and Tu (1988) found similar evidence: On average,
words in the bizarre sentences were recalled more, but the average number of
underlined words recalled per sentence was higher in the ordinary sentences.
The subject may have recalled that something odd was riding a bike
somewhere but were unable to recall that it was a dog riding the bike down the
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street. It is generally thought that the bizarreness effect is therefore due to the
retrievability of the image rather than the discriminability of the individual items
within the image. Said another way, bizarre images help retrieve the image, but
it is at the cost of recalling the specific items within the image.
When people use the method of loci, the mental path provides them with
a retrieval strategy, or retrieval context. It is then up to the user to discriminate
what object was placed in that location/context. The experiments by McDaniel
and Einstein (1986) showed that when the context was given back to subjects
in a recognition test, bizarre words were not recovered more frequently than
non-bizarre words. It would be unlikely, then, that bizarre imagery in the
context of the method of loci would be more memorable than ordinary imagery.
There are similar findings with cued recall; Wollen and Cox (1981a) found an
advantage of bizarre imagery on a free recall test, but not on a cued recall test.
While some early assumptions were made about the necessity of
bizarre images in the method of loci, the majority of cognitive psychologists
seemed to have dismissed this assumption. However, there has yet to be an
empirical demonstration one way or the other. Over 40 years ago, the belief
that bizarre imagery was a key ingredient was assumed among several
researchers who were examining the method of loci, (Crovitz, 1971; Briggs,
Hawkins, & Crovitz, 1970). At the same time, however, Gordon Bower
concluded that the notion was “entirely negative” (Bower, 1970, p. 501). To
support his evaluation, Bower (1970) described a series of 4 experiments
relayed to him in a personal communication, yet the experiments he described
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appeared to only address the issue of whether bizarre images are more
memorable than ordinary images, which we now know from the previous
section depends on several additional factors such as list composition and the
way in which memory for those images is tested. Bower’s described
experiments do not speak directly to whether or not bizarre images are more
memorable in the context of the method of loci. Briggs, Hawkins, & Crovitz
(1970) assumed bizarre imagery was critical and reported providing subjects
with a location in capital letters followed by a description of a bizarre image.
Yet it is unclear if they actually used bizarre imagery in their experiment and
they did not provide any measure (objective or subjective) of bizarreness.
Glancing at the images, some intuitively seem less bizarre than others (e.g.,
NURSERY. Picture the nursery children playing the game ‘ring around the
rosey’” versus “BOOK SHOP. Picture a tongue being used as a bookmark.”). In
perhaps the best controlled demonstration of the method of loci, Roediger
(1980) dismisses the notion that bizarre imagery enhances memory in the
method of loci and, like Bower (1970), cites work from classic imagery
experiments (Wollen et al., 1972). However, he notes that there really is no
empirical evidence one way or the other.
While much attention has been paid to the process of creating images,
far less attention has been devoted to describing the ideal conditions for the
locations. Yates (1966) described several recommendations, drawing primarily
from Ad Herennium. The best locations are thought to be isolated, solitary, and
free of people. Each location should be distinct from one another so the
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locations are not confused with one another (e.g., numerous identical columns
in a temple). The locations should be well-lit and moderately-sized so that the
images are identifiable. If the memory palace is too small, then images will be
crowded; if the palace is too large than the images will be lost. German
memory champion and journalist Florian Dellé, who has written numerous
articles describing mnemonic techniques to beginners interested in competing
themselves or just interested in learning the tricks of the trade, also provides
some recommendations about the locations. In addition to the advice laid out
in Ad Herennium, he advises people to use the first location that comes to mind
when mentally traveling along the path. He also advises people to place
images every 10 feet along the path and consistently move along the path in
either a clockwise or counter-clockwise order (Dellé, n. d.).
There is no empirical research to confirm or reject these ideas about the
locations, but the process of creating the path provides people with an
organizational strategy that is used during encoding and retrieval. Decades of
research in cognitive science has demonstrated that organized information is
easier to remember than unorganized information (Jenkins and Russell, 1952;
Bower, Clark, Lesgold, & Winzenz, 1969; Mandler, 1967). By placing items
along an ordered set of locations, subjects are organizing the to-beremembered items. Additionally, when subjects retrace the path during
retrieval, they are possibly reinstating the original spatial context, which results
in distinct cues during retrieval that match the cues during encoding (Tulving &
Thomson, 1973). When subjects wish to recall the items, the predetermined
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familiar set of locations is as readily available to subjects as they were during
encoding. Each location serves as a distinct retrieval cue to a particular item
that provides subjects with a clear retrieval strategy (Bower, 1970). Therefore,
the items placed in the locations are more accessible during recall (Groninger,
1971). Furthermore, because the locations are fixed and each item is
associated to a location and not another item, forgetting one item should not
disrupt the recall of other items (Roediger, 1980). The organization used in the
method of loci may have particular mnemonic value because it makes use of
spatial navigation, which likely played an important role in the evolution of our
cognitive functions. Additionally, the method of loci may capitalize on people’s
superior navigation in the presence of familiar landmarks (Maguire, Burgess, &
O’Keefe, 1999; Siegal & White, 1975; Ruddle, Payne, & Jones, 1997).
Empirical Evidence for the Method of Loci
In the previous section, I discussed how the method of loci is used,
along with specific recommendations from people who have used it. When
possible, I provided evidence from psychological research to support or
dismiss these recommendations. The bulk of the experiments described,
however, were not directly concerned with the method of loci, and specific
comments that I cited were often not the topic of those researchers’
experiments. More importantly, I have not established the effectiveness of the
method of loci through empirical demonstrations. In this section I review the
available empirical evidence in support of the effectiveness of the method of
loci.
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Although controlled experiments examining the method of loci are rare,
the results can be quite impressive (Bower, 1970). In perhaps one of the
earliest demonstrations of the method of loci, Ross and Lawrence (1968)
taught five subjects a path with 52 locations that were later used across four
successive days to learn 40 words that were viewed at the subjects’ own pace
(about 14 seconds per word). On an immediate recall test, subjects recalled on
average 38 words; on a test a day later subjects recalled 34 of the 40 words. In
one of the first experiments to compare the method of loci to a control
condition, Roediger (1980) demonstrated that mnemonic techniques (imagery,
the link method, peg-word method, and the method of loci) produced a
mnemonic advantage relative to rehearsal. In particular, the method of loci and
peg-word method were especially useful when the order of the items was
important. Massen & Vaterrodt-Plünnecke (2006) replicated these findings with
categorized lists and also showed that the locations can be reused with
minimal proactive interference. Lee and Ewards (1981) demonstrated that
students who used the method of loci remembered more than students who
used verbal elaboration. De Beni and Cornoldi extended the basic findings with
word lists to word triplets (e.g., KEY-PARADE-FLY); subjects recalled more
word triplets using the method of loci compared to an image only control (De
Beni & Cornoldi, 1985). The method has also been used often in combination
with other techniques to improve memory in older adults (Verhaeghen & Kliegl,
2000; Yesavage & Rose, 1983). In a meta-analysis aimed at examining the
effects of various mnemonic techniques on older adults, the method of loci was
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reported to have a Cohen’s d of 0.80 [0.58, 1.02] (Verhaeghen, Marcoen, &
Gosseens, 1992).
The basic procedures of the method of loci have largely remained
unchanged for over two thousand years, but the mnemonic device does appear
to be flexible in how it is used. For example, often people were asked to first
memorize a set of locations, usually in a separate session (e.g., De Beni &
Cornoldi, 1985; Roediger, 1980). However, this does not appear to be
necessary. Crovitz (1969) provided subjects with a map of an imaginary street
with various locations (e.g., “electric company,” “gas station,” “florist”). On a
final recall test, subjects were given back the locations and recalled an average
of 34 out of 40 words in the correct order. It is difficult to interpret the
effectiveness of this method because the author reports that 2 of the 12
subjects missed 19 and 29 words, respectively. On one hand, the average
number of words recalled may be near ceiling for the majority of subjects. On
the other hand, it appears as though 10% of the subjects were unable to
successfully use the method. Briggs, Hawkins, & Crovitz (1970) extended this
idea and also provided subjects with the locations and images (e.g., “Electric
company: picture a PLOW cutting an underground cable. The word is PLOW,”
“Gas station: Picture the attendant angrily driving a NAIL into your tire. The
word is NAIL.”) When given the locations and images by the experimenter,
subjects recalled an average of 17 out of 20 words. This procedure has also
been used with subjects as young as 9 and as old as 78 years old (Brehmer,
Li, Muller, Oertzen, and Lindenberger, 2007; see also Lee & Edwards, 1981).
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However, in all of these cases it is unknown how many words subjects in a
self-generated condition might have recalled had such a condition existed. It is
possible that recall performance may have been higher in a condition in which
subjects created their own images.
Similarly, Legge, Madan, Ng, & Caplan (2012) used a computergenerated virtual reality environment in place of familiar locations. It is possible
that people do not need to create their own locations, but there has yet to be
enough controlled comparisons to make this claim. In addition, in their recent
book, Mnemonology: Mnemonics for the 21st Century, Worthen and Hunt
(2011) concluded that self-generated mnemonics (not specifically the method
of loci) are more effective than other-generated mnemonics when the
mnemonic is easier to use (Ironsmith & Lutz, 1996; Jamieson & Schimpf, 1980)
but not when mnemonics are difficult such as the phonetic mnemonic system
(Patton, D’Aaro, & Gaudette, 1991). Whether the method of loci is an easy to
use mnemonic or a difficult mnemonic is up for debate.
Up until now, the method of loci has been described to remember simple
one-word materials, typically objects. The method has also been used with
complex materials. The mnemonic improved high school students’ recall of
lengthy passages compared to students who used rehearsal (Bellezza, 1981)
and may be more beneficial when the text is heard out loud rather than read
silently (Cornoldi & De Beni, 1991; De Beni, Moe, & Cornoldi, 1997; Moe & De
Beni, 2005). Medical students who used the method of loci to learn about the
endocrine system performed better on a final multiple choice test than did

34
students who learned the same information in lecture format (Qureshi, Rizvi,
Syed, Shahid, & Manzoor, 2014).
Up to this point, I described what the method of loci is and have shown
that it was not only a popular tool among ancient orators, but that it also
remains in use today as one of the foundational techniques used during
memory competitions worldwide. I also discussed recommendations of how to
use it and, when possible, discussed what the literature from cognitive science
says about those recommendations. Finally, I reviewed the available literature
concerning the method, which is rather limited. The present experiments will
use the method of loci to answer questions concerning the mnemonic value of
animacy and will also address some unresolved questions about the method of
loci, specifically concerning bizarre imagery and the lack of a control condition
for comparison.
Experiments
The following experiments were aimed at exploring the mnemonic
effects of animacy in the method of loci – a context that provides people with a
pre-existing organization structure. There are several reasons why the method
of loci was used in the present experiments. As mentioned in a previous
section, the primary reason is concerned with animacy. In the current
experiment, the method provided a salient organizational strategy during
encoding that was then available again during retrieval. As a result, the recall
test was not a free recall test that relied on subjects’ unique output strategy, but
rather the test held the output strategy constant across subjects so that the
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recall test was primarily a measure of item-specific information. If these
experiments used a typical free recall test, I would expect an effect of animacy
such that animate words and images would be recalled more than inanimate
words and images. However, the current experiment did not use a traditional
free recall task. Instead, subjects were provided with an explicit output strategy
that relied heavily on the encoding order. It is unclear whether the animacy
effect would persist in such a context and, if so, whether the effect would be
smaller relative to a control condition that did not rely on output order (e.g.,
making pleasantness ratings).
Furthermore, it could be argued that the animacy effect occurs not
because animates are innately more memorable, but because they belong to
the same category and therefore can be categorized at output. Despite
researchers’ best attempts to equate the animate and inanimate word pairs
along various important cognitive dimensions including category size and
instance, if the animacy effect is due to categorization during retrieval, an
organizational strategy like the method of loci should eliminate the effect. I do
not predict that the animacy effect is due to categorization during retrieval.
Finally, in the present experiments subjects associated images of words
to specific locations, a task that may have similarities to a paired associate
task. Animates may capture attention or be more memorable at the cost of the
paired associate (as was the case with negative valence words in Madan et al.,
2012). If this is the case, then the location associated with the animate image
may have been forgotten resulting in worse performance for animate words
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because the mnemonic strategy would be unavailable during recall (i.e., the
locations would not be available to cue the retrieval of the animate words).
A secondary reason for using the method of loci in the present
experiment was to examine the method in controlled experiments. In the first
experiment, the method of loci was compared to a control condition
(pleasantness ratings) that is traditionally considered one of the best deep,
encoding tasks (e.g., Packman & Battig, 1978). If the claims of memory
champions are to be believed, then subjects who used the method of loci
should vastly outperform subjects who did not.

37

EXPERIMENT 1
The primary goal of this experiment was to determine if the animacy
effect existed in recall with a fixed or predetermined output order as in the
method of loci, and if so, whether the effect was similar for the method of loci
and the pleasantness control condition. Subjects learned a list of words; half of
the words were animate and the other half were inanimate. These words were
matched along 10 memory-relevant dimensions (see Nairne et al., 2013;
VanArsdall et al., 2015). In one condition, subjects were taught to use the
method of loci to memorize a list of words for a later free recall test. In an
incidental learning control condition, subjects rated the pleasantness of each
word – a task that draws attention to the unique characteristics of an item and
is traditionally considered to be one of the best deep encoding tasks (e.g.,
Packman & Battig,1978). If this experiment was a typical free recall
experiment, I would expect that memory for animate objects would be better
than memory for inanimate objects because animate objects hold a privileged
place in our adaptive memories. For this reason, I expected an animacy
advantage in the pleasantness condition. However, the following experiment
was unlike the free recall experiments in which adaptive memory is typically
examined. Here, the method of loci provided subjects with an encoding and
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output strategy that emphasized the temporal order of the words. If animate
objects increase memory for the animate item but reduce memory for order or
the associated location, the mnemonic effects of animacy would be lessened or
nonexistent in the method of loci condition relative to the pleasantness control
condition. A second goal of Experiment 1 was to demonstrate the mnemonic
superiority of the method of loci relative to a control. If the method of loci is truly
a powerful mnemonic technique, then subjects who used the method of loci
should recall more words than subjects who made pleasantness ratings.
Method
Subjects
One hundred and fifty-four subjects (94 female, 60 male) were recruited
online via a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) posted on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. An additional 27 subjects were tested and excluded from data analysis
for the following reasons: 1 subject indicated cheating on the task, 9 subjects
reported computer/user errors, and 16 did not comply with instructions during
the method of loci task (9 subjects left more than 6 responses blank during
study, 3 subjects retyped the word instead of creating an image, and 4 subjects
were determined to be completely off task which included responding to words
with memories from childhood or writing various locations across the world).
Subjects were restricted to people who were located in the United States, had
a 95% HIT acceptance rate, and had completed at least 1000 HITs.
Demographic information (age, gender, native-language) was collected at the
beginning of the study (see Table 1), and additional information about the
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workers’ environment, whether they cheated, and computer specifications were
collected in a post-experiment questionnaire. The mean age of the subjects
was 36.7 years (SD = 12.13, range = 18-69). Subjects were paid $1.50 to
complete the task, which lasted about 20 - 25 min.
Design
This experiment used a 2 (word type: animate, inanimate) x 2 (condition:
method of loci, pleasantness) repeated measures design with word as a withinsubjects factor and condition as a between subjects factor. There were 77
subjects in the pleasantness condition and 77 in the method of loci condition.
Number of words recalled on an immediate recall test was the dependent
variable.
Materials
A list of 30 words1, of which 15 were animate and 15 were inanimate,
were selected from Nairne et al. (2013; note that 6 additional words were
added to the original 24 words to create a list of 30). The two sets of word
types (animate and inanimate) were matched along 10 relevant dimensions:
age of acquisition, category size, category typicality, concreteness, familiarity,
imagery, written frequency, meaningfulness, number of letters, and

1

Due to a program error that occurred with the first 120 subjects, only 14 inanimate words
appeared, resulting in a total of 29 words instead of the intended 30 words. The program error
was fixed and an additional 17 subjects were then included in both the pleasantness and
method of loci conditions for a total of 34 additional subjects. These additional 34 subjects who
were shown all 30 words showed the same pattern of results as the original 120 subjects.
Therefore, the results are reported with all 154 subjects.
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relatedness. For additional information about these dimensions and a complete
list of words, see Appendix C.
Procedure
After workers accepted the HIT, electronically signed the informed
consent, and completed the demographic information, the experiment began.
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the method of loci condition or the
pleasantness ratings condition. All subjects then took a final recall test followed
by a post-experiment questionnaire.
In the method of loci condition, the subjects were first given basic
instructions. They were told they would learn a list of words by imagining
placing items along a familiar path, such as a childhood home. On a later test,
they would be asked to mentally retrace their steps to recall the items placed in
each location. Subjects were also given examples of how the method of loci
might be used to remember a couple practice words (e.g., “imagine that the
PEACH is so large that it is blocking you from the driveway”). For the complete
instructions used in Experiment 1, see Appendix D.
The to-be-remembered words were presented in a random order one at
a time for each subject. After the presentation of each word, subjects typed in a
box labeled “Location” the location where they imagined placing the word and
typed in a box labeled “Image” a brief description of the image. The task was
self-paced, and subjects spent on average 10.8 min in total for this task. After
the final word was presented, subjects were asked to recall the words by
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mentally walking through their house and remembering the objects they placed
there. Subjects were given 4 min for this task.
In the pleasantness condition, subjects rated the pleasantness of each
word on a 5-point scale, with 1 being very offensive and 5 being very pleasant.
Although the instructions for the pleasantness rating task did not explicitly
mention a final recall test, the description for the HIT informed subjects that
they would be asked to memorize a list of 30 words. The task was self-paced,
and subjects spent an average of 2.5 min in total for this task. After the final
word was rated, subjects were asked to recall as many of the words as they
could in 4 min.
Results
Initial Method of Loci and Pleasantness Performance
A preliminary analysis eliminated subjects who did not appear to
complete the method of loci task. To do this, I developed a list of minimum
requirements for inclusion based on subjects’ image and location responses.
Subjects’ were included if their responses: (1) have no more than 6 blanks, (2)
consist of more than the retyped word and, perhaps most importantly, (3)
contain locations rather than random memories associated with each item2 or

2

For example, for the word “journal” a subject wrote “during my college days” for the location
and “me myself serving one among the editorial member of college journal” for the image; for
the word “rake” the subject wrote “during trekking” for the location and “As bachelors we used
to rake frequently for trekking and other adventurous activities” for the image.
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free associations to the item that do not resemble anything like a path3. As
stated in the previous section, 16 out of 77 people (9 of whom were eliminated
for leaving more than 6 blanks) did not meet these criteria and were replaced.
Subjects in the pleasantness condition were eliminated if they made the same
rating for all words or left more than 6 ratings blank. This never happened.
A 2 X 2 mixed ANOVA was used (with condition as a between-subjects
factor and word type as a within-subjects factor) to analyze the time subjects
took to complete the pleasantness and method of loci tasks. Subjects took
longer to complete the method of loci task than to make the pleasantness
ratings, Ms = 21.6 s vs 5.1 s per word, F(1, 152) = 118.34, ɳ2 = .44, p < .001.
Reaction times for animate and inanimate words were similar, Ms = 13.5 s vs
13.2, F(1, 152) = 0.27, ɳ2 = .00, p = .61. There was no interaction, F(1, 152) =
0.39, ɳ2 = .00, p = .53.
Recall Performance
Figure 1 shows the performance on the recall test. A 2 X 2 mixed
ANOVA was used to analyze recall performance4. Overall, recall was higher in
the method of loci condition, Ms = .68 vs .38, F(1, 152) = 99.30, ɳ2 = .40, p <
.001, which demonstrated that a brief period of instructions in the method of
loci was sufficient to produce large mnemonic benefits. Additionally, animate
3

For example, for the word “violin” a subject wrote “concert” for the location and “Atlanta” for
the image; for the word “soldier” the subject wrote “Afghanistan” for the location and “military”
for the image.
4
Due to the large range of subjects, age was entered as a covariate for all experiments, and
the pattern of results was the same. Also an analysis with gender as a between subjects factor
indicated that there were no differences between genders so the results have been collapsed
across this variable.
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words were recalled more than inanimate words, Ms = .60 vs .45, F(1, 152) =
124.60, ɳ2 = .45, p < .001. This advantage for animate words was quite robust:
Out of 154 subjects, 112 recalled more animate words than inanimate words,
24 recalled more inanimate than animate words, and 18 recalled the same
amount of both words. However, these main effects were qualified by an
interaction such that the animacy effect was smaller in the method of loci
condition than in the pleasantness condition, F(1, 152) = 18.89, p < 0.001. A
post-hoc analysis indicated that the animacy effect persisted both in the
method of loci, t(76) = 5.25, d = 0.60 [0.35, 0.84] and pleasantness condition,
t(76) = 10.20, d = 1.16[0.87, 1.45].
Reaction time data was not recorded for one subject in the method of
loci condition, so the results are reported with 153 subjects. Because the
method of loci provided subjects with an output strategy during retrieval (i.e.,
mentally retracing the path), it would be unsurprising if subjects spent less time
per word during the recall in this condition. Indeed, this was the case: Subjects
in the method of loci condition recalled words faster than did subjects in the
pleasantness condition, M = 9.2 s vs 12.1 s per word, t(152) = 3.71, d = 0.60,
95% CI [0.27, 0.92].
Table 2 reports the average number of words recalled that were not on
the list. The mean number of intrusions per subject was low for both groups,
but overall, more intrusions occurred in the method of loci group (Ms = 0.64 vs
0.47). Intrusions were further classified in two ways. First, when intruded words
were a synonym of a list word (e.g. the subject recalled “dad” when the list
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word was “father,” or “diary” instead of “journal”), the intrusion was labeled as a
“synonym.” When the intruded word had no clear similarity to a list word, it was
labeled as “other intrusions.” This was done because synonyms were fairly
common in the method of loci group relative to the pleasantness group (Ms =
0.47 vs 0.12). This is likely because subjects recalled images rather than the
exact word, per se. The total number of intrusions is therefore the sum of both
the synonyms and intrusions. Because the primary concern of this experiment
was the mnemonic value of animacy, intrusions were further classified as either
animate or inanimate5. To use the previous example of a subject who intruded
“dad,” this synonym would be further categorized as an animate, as would the
intrusion “frog.” Overall, the pattern of synonyms follows the pattern of recall
performance: More animate than inanimate synonyms for list words were
recalled in both the method of loci group (Ms = 0.35 vs 0.12) and pleasantness
group (Ms = 0.09 vs 0.03). It is unsurprising that the pattern of results with
these synonyms mirrors the pattern of results with the list words, given that
they can be considered as words that were almost correctly recalled, but not
quite. The pattern was reversed for other intrusions: More inanimate intrusions
were recalled than animate intrusions in both the method of loci group (Ms =
0.12 vs. 0.05) and pleasantness group (Ms = 0.23 vs 0.12).

5

Note that this analysis is independent of the within-subject independent variable because
intrusions in a within-subjects design cannot be calculated along this variable.
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Recall Output Order
I also analyzed the organization of subjects’ recall responses. One goal
was to measure whether subjects who used the method of loci relied on a
temporal organization to recall the words. If the method of loci provided
subjects with a temporal organization strategy during encoding and retrieval,
then those subjects would likely have a higher-than-chance measure of
temporal output order and also likely have a higher temporal measure than
subjects in the pleasantness control condition. To measure temporal output
order, I calculated input-output correspondence (Asch & Ebenholtz, 1962) and
temporal factor (Polyn, Norman, & Kahana, 2009) for each subject. The AschEbenholtz input-output correspondence was calculated in the following way:
Imagine that a student recalled, in order, words 1, 2, 8, 6, and 3 from the list. If
neighboring words are considered as pairs, then the student recalled four pairs
(1-2, 2-8, 8-6, 6-3). In this case, two of the four pairs (1-2 and 2-8) show the
correct sequence, resulting in an overall proportion of correctly ordered words
of 0.50 (chance performance). The temporal factor described by Polyn et al.
also measures output order but it provides a more general temporal order by
taking into account the temporal order of not only immediate neighboring words
but also other nearby words.
Overall, subjects who used the method of loci were more likely to recall
the words in serial order relative to subjects who made pleasantness ratings.
This was true when temporal order was measured using the Asch-Ebenholtz
(1962) input output correspondence, Ms = 0.63 vs. 0.46, t(152) = 6.36, d =
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1.02, 95% CI [0.69, 1.36], and the Polyn et al. temporal factor measure, Ms =
0.65 vs. 0.57, t (152) = 2.57, d = 0.42, 95% CI [0.09, 0.74]. This suggests that
subjects in the method of loci condition relied on temporal order more than did
subjects in the pleasantness condition, whose serial output scores were around
chance.
These temporal measures also provided an opportunity to glimpse into
whether subjects’ who recalled more animate than inanimate words relied more
or less on serial order. First, I calculated the difference between the number of
inanimate words from the number of animate words subjects recalled. This
served as a measure of the subjects’ animacy effect. I then calculated the
correlation of this difference with the subjects’ temporal score to determine the
extent to which subjects who recalled more animate words depended on serial
order. A large negative correlation would mean that subjects who
demonstrated a larger animacy effect depended less on serial order. While
there was no significant difference in the correlations for each group
individually, when combined across both groups, the difference scores were
negatively correlated with the input-output scores, r(151) = -.17, p = .03, and a
non-significant trend with the temporal factor, r(151) = -.08, p = .35. In
combination with the interaction that was observed in the recall performance,
these data suggest that using temporal order as an output strategy may
decrease the animacy effect.
I also analyzed the semantic organization of subjects’ recall responses.
This is of particular interest because it is possible that the animacy effect
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occurs, at least in part, because subjects notice that animate words fall under a
general category of “living things.” Knowing this category cue could then aid
the retrieval of words in that category. If this were the case, I would expect
subjects to cluster their recall around things with similar semantic features in
both the method of loci and pleasantness conditions. To do this, I calculated
the semantic factor for each subject. Semantic factor uses Latent Semantic
Analysis (or LSA) to measure the relatedness of words. As with temporal
factor, a semantic factor of .50 indicates chance semantic grouping Sederberg,
Miller, Howard, & Kahana, 2010). The semantic factors for the method of loci
and pleasantness conditions were not significantly different than chance (M =
.50), M = .53, t(75) = 1.14, p =.26 and M =.51, t(76) = 1.97, p=.053
respectively, which indicates no semantic grouping in either condition. This is
unsurprising in the method of loci condition because subjects were instructed
to mentally retrace their steps through their memory palace during recall and
the results of the previous temporal analyses indicate that, for the most part,
subjects did recall in order. In addition, in both conditions the animate words
were carefully selected to belong to a matched number of categories as the
inanimate words. The semantic factor calculated here provides additional
evidence that animate objects were memorable because they were animate
objects, not because of their membership in a category.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the mnemonic advantage for
animate words relative to inanimate words persisted when subjects used the
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method of loci which relied on order information. However, the animacy effect
in the method of loci was smaller relative to the pleasantness control condition
which did not rely on order. This may have occurred because animate objects
are more memorable on an item-level at the cost of order information. The
negative correlation between the difference scores and temporal output scores
provide similar evidence: Subjects who had a larger animacy effect relied less
on temporal order. The correlation was small and is not causal but shows the
same pattern as the interaction between the animacy effect and condition
(method of loci versus pleasantness ratings).
The results of Experiment 1 also highlight the mnemonic value of the
method of loci. Overall, subjects who used the method of loci recalled almost
twice as many words as subjects in the pleasantness condition (Ms = .68 vs.
.38). One subject who used the method of loci recalled all 30 words on the list.
By contrast the highest scoring subject in the pleasantness condition recalled
only 25 words. It is interesting to note that this high level of performance was
achieved with minimal instructions. Given the range of training techniques and
instructions provided to subjects in previous studies involving method of loci, it
is useful to know that subjects can learn to use the method after only a brief
period of instructions. The results of this experiment suggest that extensive
training is not required in order to experience mnemonic benefits of the method
of loci. Experiment 2 was carried out as a further investigation of animacy
effects with the method of loci.
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EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 1, animate words were remembered better than
inanimate words, even when the words were used in an ordered task such as
the method of loci. Do animate images show the same pattern? To borrow an
example from Joshua Foer, does imagining the wine bottles as living beings,
talking amongst themselves make the wine bottles more memorable? To
examine this, subjects in Experiment 2 saw only inanimate words and were
either given the same instructions for the method of loci as in Experiment 1 (the
inanimate control condition) or they were explicitly told to create animate
images (e.g., “is laughing”) of the otherwise inanimate objects (e.g., “coin”). It is
noteworthy that by doing this, subjects in both conditions viewed the exact
same stimuli. The difference, then, was in how the words were processed (as
animates or inanimates). Because the animacy manipulation occurred in the
instructions, the most straightforward approach was to use a between-subjects
design. This allowed me to keep all other aspects of Experiment 2 the same.
That is, subjects were given one set of instructions at the onset of the
experiment and they were uninterrupted while they created their memory
palaces. I predicted Joshua Foer and other memory athletes were correct:
creating animate images would produce a memory boost. Therefore, I
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predicted that subjects who created animate images would recall more words
than subjects who did not create animate images.
Method
Subjects
One hundred and twenty subjects (52 female, 62 male, and 6 people
who did not identify their gender) were recruited online via a Human
Intelligence Task (HIT) posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. An additional 6
subjects were tested and excluded for the following reasons: 1 subject
completed the experiment on a smartphone, 3 subjects reported computer/user
errors, and 2 subjects were determined to be completely off task which
included responding to words with memories from childhood or writing various
locations across the world. None of the subjects in Experiment 2 had
participated in Experiment 1. The mean age of the subjects was 33.9 years
(SD = 10.0, range = 20-74). The demographic information collection, post
survey questionnaire, and worker restrictions used in Experiment 2 were the
same as Experiment 1 (see Table 1). Subjects were paid $2.00 to complete the
task, which lasted about 20 – 25 min.
Design
This experiment used a between-subjects design with two conditions:
animate and inanimate imagery. There were 60 subjects in each condition. The
number of words recalled on an immediate recall test was the dependent
variable.
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Materials
Thirty unrelated, inanimate nouns (e.g., “coin,” “diamond”) were drawn
from the extended Pavio norms (Clark & Pavio, 2004). All words were between
three and seven letters long and were high in concreteness (M = 6.90),
familiarity (M = 6.13), and imagery (M = 6.54). For a list of words used in
Experiment 2, see Appendix C.
Procedure
The method of loci procedure from Experiment 1 was the same in
Experiment 2 with the exception that subjects in the animacy condition were
specifically told to imagine that the objects were alive. As in Experiment 1,
subjects were given two examples. In the inanimate condition the examples
were the same as Experiment 1 (e.g., “imagine that the PEACH is so large that
it is blocking you from the driveway”). However, in the animate condition the
examples included features of animate objects (e.g., “imagine that the PEACH
is angrily trying to block you from the driveway”). Subjects spent an average of
13.2 min in total for this task. Subjects were then given 4 min to recall the
words.
Results
Initial Method of Loci Performance
Using the same criteria as Experiment 1, 2 out of 120 subjects were
eliminated for freely associating random locations or memories rather than
creating a path. Reaction times for animate and inanimate images were similar,
Ms = 28.3 vs. 24.5 ms per word, t(118) = 1.17, d = 0.21, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.57].
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Categorization of Animate Responses: How do Subjects Conceptualize
Animacy?
In this experiment subjects were asked to animate inanimate objects. It
is therefore interesting to examine how subjects conceptualized animacy. What
characteristics did subjects assign to the inanimate objects in order to animate
them? Did subjects imagine the objects as self-propelled and with intentions?
To do this, I determined whether certain animate characteristics were present
in the images. The initial inspiration for these characteristics was drawn from
the literature concerned with defining animacy, but I also created additional
characteristics that did not easily fit into any previously nominalized
characteristic of animacy. Each image response often had multiple
characteristics. For example “playing a tuba” is an example of both selfgenerated movement and human-like behavior.
The top of Table 3 shows the animate characteristics that were given to
animate the objects in order of most frequent to least frequent. The second
column from the right also shows the proportion of responses that included a
given characteristic. For example, the most common characteristic was selfgenerated movement: The proportion of animate images that included selfgenerated movement was 0.26. This means that about 1 out of every 4 images
included this characteristic. Responses ranged from short one-word answers
with only one animate characteristic such as “hiding” (in this case the animate
characteristic is planning or pursuing a goal) to up to 5 characteristics in one
response such as “On my bed, is a piece of burnt toast, with a scowling face,
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thrashing around trying to get to sleep on my bed.” In this second case the
animate characteristics include self-generated movement (thrashing around),
human-like behavior/emotions (scowling), has a face, and has a goal (trying to
sleep).
Recall Performance
Figure 2 shows performance on the immediate recall test. Overall, there
was no clear benefit for processing words as animates over processing words
as inanimates, Ms = 0.68 vs 0.67, t(118) = 0.33, d = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.42].
Reaction time data did not save for three subjects, so the results are reported
with 117 subjects. Reaction times for animate and inanimate words were
almost identical, Ms = 9.7 vs. 9.6 s per word, t(115) = 0.003, d = 0.00, 95% CI
[-0.36, 0.37].
Table 4 reports the average number of words that were recalled that
were not on the list. All of the intrusions were inanimate objects. The mean
number of intrusions per subject was low for both groups, but overall more
intrusions occurred in the animate group than inanimate group (Ms = 0.70 vs
0.55). Intrusions were again further classified into synonyms and other
intrusions as in Experiment 1. Overall, the pattern of synonyms followed the
pattern of recall performance: There was no difference between the number of
synonyms recalled in the animate group compared to the inanimate group (Ms
= 0.35 vs 0.32). The pattern was similar for other intrusions: Although very
small, subjects in the animate group intruded slightly more than subjects in the
inanimate group (Ms = 0.35 vs 0.23).
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Recall Output Order
The overall input-output correspondence and temporal factor in
Experiment 2 were similar as Experiment 1 for both the animate and the
inanimate conditions, (Input-output correspondence, Ms = 0.60 vs. .64;
temporal factor, 0.67 vs. 0.68) which demonstrated that subjects were relying
on some sort of temporal organization during retrieval. The semantic factor was
around chance for both the animate and inanimate conditions, M = .54, t(59) =
3.05, p = .003 and M = .54, t(59)= 4.96, p = .000, indicating that subjects may
have relied on semantic categories during recall.
Despite the instructions to animate the objects, not every image
explicitly included animate characteristics. These responses were also coded
and are represented in the bottom half of Table 3. It is interesting to note that a
large proportion of responses did not explicitly include animate characteristics
(38%). Of the 60 subjects in the animate condition, 17 did not include any
animate characteristics in their responses. Therefore, their responses make up
14% of the 38% of inanimate responses which means that the remaining 21%
percent of inanimate responses were from subjects who included a mix of
animate and inanimate characteristics. It is difficult to know in these cases
whether the animacy of the objects was implied in the subjects’ minds or
whether the objects remained truly inanimate. For example, a subject wrote,
“coffee spilling on the floor.” It is unclear what the cause of the spill is here. The
coffee may have revolted against the mug and may be escaping to the floor or
the coffee pot may have been unattended resulting in coffee dripping from a
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pot into an overflowing mug and onto the floor. It is not possible to know from
the brief descriptions. For this reason, I included all responses from subjects
regardless of their inanimate characteristics.
Additionally, an exploratory analysis was done to determine whether
certain animate characteristics resulted in higher recall. It is possible that
certain characteristics are stronger markers of animacy than other
characteristics (such as self-generated movement) which may lead to higher
levels of recall. The far right column of Table 3 shows the recall performance
for words that were given the associated animate characteristics. Generally,
the recall performance was consistent across characteristics, both animate and
inanimate: Certain animate characteristics did not produce greater or worse
memory for the associated word. I hesitate to draw strong conclusions about
the recallability of certain animate characteristics because of the exploratory
and conditional nature of this analysis (and the ambiguity of the actual image
the subject created as in the case of the spilled coffee). It is possible that
certain characteristics such as self-generated movement and pursuing a goal
may be more memorable than other characteristics such as growing.
In addition to analyzing the type of characteristic, another analysis was
aimed at exploring recall differences based on the number of characteristics.
Perhaps the animate words in Experiment 1 readily brought to mind an array of
animate characteristics whereas the images subjects created in Experiment 2
could bring to mind only a limited number of characteristics. For example, for
the animate word “judge,” there is an array of animate characteristics that could
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easily come to mind. We know that judges can walk on their own, use
language, have emotions, have faces, were once children (and therefore
grow), have wishes, and desires, etc. When subjects are tasked with animating
a word with only a single phrase, such as “bouncing on the walls,” the number
of animate characteristics – and inferences about what that object may do – is
limited. In this example, perhaps the only animate characteristic is selfgenerated movement. Likewise, the phrase mentioned previously about the
thrashing burnt toast contains 5 characteristics. In the present experiment, a
logistic regression analysis was used to predict recall using the number of
animate characteristics associated with each word as predictors. The number
of characteristics was not a significant predictor (chi squared = 0.82, p = .37
with df = 1). The EXP(B) value indicated that for every additional animate
characteristic subjects included, subjects were no more likely to recall the
associated word, EXP(B) = 0.92, or 0.92 times as likely. As with the type of
animate characteristic, the number of characteristics may be related to an
item’s recallability, but these differences are not detectable under the
conditions of this experiment.
Bizarre and Imagery Ratings
In this experiment subjects were asked to take inanimate objects and
either transform them into animate objects or keep them inanimate. In the first
situation, it is reasonable to expect that the resulting image would be more
bizarre or difficult to imagine. In typical free recall experiments, bizarre imagers
are more memorable than ordinary images, but only in mixed list designs.
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To obtain bizarreness and imagery ratings, 52 Mechanical Turk workers
who had not participated in Experiment 2 rated how normal or bizarre the
images were; 52 different subjects rated how difficult or easy it was to create
an image of the word-image pairs. Because the current experiment was
between subjects, half of the subjects in each group rated the images from the
animate condition and the other half rated images from the inanimate
conditions. Rating all possible word and image combinations (3600 images in
total) was not practical so a random subset of 50 of the pairs was selected for
each subject. Subjects saw the word and image phrase (e.g., “DOLLAR:
Resting and snoring”) and were asked to rate how bizarre each image was on
a scale of 1-5 where 1 was very normal and 5 was very bizarre. Subjects who
made imagery ratings were asked to rate how difficult or easy it was to create
an image in which 1 was very difficult to image and 5 was very easy to image.
Ratings were self-paced and subjects were instructed to make the ratings
based only on the image and not on grammatical errors.
As expected, the images created in the animate condition were rated as
more bizarre than the images created in the inanimate condition, Ms = 3.28 vs.
2.63, t(50) = 6.38, d = 1.77 95%CI [1.12, 2.41]. Animate images were also
rated as more difficult to image than the images created in the inanimate
condition, Ms = 2.88 vs. 3.62, t(50) = 5.90, d = 1.70 95%CI [1.04, 2.35]. This is
unsurprising given that bizarre images tend to be more difficult to imagine
(McDaniel & Einstein, 1986).
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Discussion
When subjects were asked to process objects as either animate or
inanimate in a between-subjects design, there was no animacy effect. There
are several possible explanations for why this may be the case. The first
possibility is that animacy effects are only found with animate and inanimate
words. VanArsdall et al. (2013) demonstrated the animacy effect with
nonwords that were paired with phrase. In that case, nonwords had no prior
characteristics, animate or inanimate. In the current experiment, all words were
inanimate and half of the subjects were asked to add animate characteristics to
inanimate words. Perhaps the inanimate characteristics of the words cannot be
“overridden” with animate images. This seems unlikely given the pervasiveness
of animated inanimate objects in everyday life (e.g., the examples from earlier
such as Mrs. Pots from Beauty and the Beast). A related possible explanation
is that this task was too difficult for subjects to do. Perhaps it was too difficult to
create both 30 unique locations and also 30 examples of animate images.
Possible evidence for this is that 38% of images did not explicitly contain
animate imagery. In Experiment 3, I avoided this by providing subjects with the
images. A third possible explanation is that the animacy effect does not appear
in between-subjects designs. To my knowledge, there have been no betweensubjects manipulations of animacy. In Experiment 3, I returned to a withinsubjects design.
In Experiment 2, subjects were asked to create animate images of
inanimate objects, resulting in a rather large list of animate images. These
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images provide a starting point for an empirical classification system of animate
characteristics. Of particular interest was the frequency with which subjects
attributed animacy to objects by including self-generated movement. Selfgenerated movement is generally considered one of the primary dynamic cues
of animacy and may be the characteristic that comes to mind most easily. At
this point, any conclusions based on this experiment are speculation.
Additional, controlled experiments aimed specifically at examining this issue
are needed.
This experiment also provided additional information about the method
of loci. As in Experiment 1, the method of loci was an effective mnemonic
strategy despite minimal instructions. With no extensive training on the method
or additional study, subjects recalled on average 20 out of 30 words. The
results from Experiment 2 also shed light on existing speculation regarding the
use of bizarre images in the method of loci. Frequent users of the method often
promote creating bizarre images to facilitate later recall, yet this experiment
suggests that turning every image on a list into a bizarre one will not provide a
mnemonic benefit.
Experiment 3 was designed to continue investigating the mnemonic
effects of animate images of inanimate words using the method of loci. In this
experiment, images were provided to subjects and were presented in a mixed
list resulting in a within-subjects design. Providing subjects with the images
also ensured that animate words truly were processed as animates.
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EXPERIMENT 3
In the second experiment, the task of animating objects was up to the
subjects and was carried out in a between-subjects design to keep the task
straightforward and the instructions consistent for each subject (i.e., subjects
either received the special instructions to animate the objects or they did not).
However, 38% of the images subjects created in the animate condition did not
explicitly contain animate characteristics. Although these words were not
recalled any differently than images that did explicitly contain animate
characteristics, a goal of Experiment 3 was to remove this ambiguity by pairing
words with predetermined images that were either animate or inanimate. By
providing subjects with the images, I was also able to reintroduce a within
subjects design. In the current experiment, subjects were again instructed to
mentally place the target words along a path such as a childhood home.
However, unlike the previous experiments, I provided the images, half of which
were animate (e.g., “playing tennis”) and half of which were inanimate (e.g.,
“made of wood”). Subjects were told to imagine the object and create a location
for it along their path. I predicted that providing subjects with images that are
clearly either animate or inanimate and returning to a within subjects design
would produce an animacy effect.
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Method
Subjects
Sixty subjects (32 female, 24 male, and 4 people who did not identify
their gender) were recruited online via a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) posted
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. An additional 2 subjects were tested and
excluded from the experiment because 1 subject reported computer/user
errors, and 1 subject was determined to be completely off task, which included
freely associating words to writing various locations across the world. None of
the subjects in Experiment 3 had participated in either Experiment 1 or 2. The
mean age of the subjects was 36.9 years (SD = 11.6, range = 19 - 65). The
same demographic information collection, post survey questionnaire and
worker restrictions from Experiments 1 and 2 applied in Experiment 3 (see
Table 1). Subjects were paid $2.00 to complete the task, which lasted about 25
min.
Design
This experiment used a within-subjects design with two conditions:
animate and inanimate imagery. Half of the words from the list were paired with
animate images (e.g., “playing tennis”) and the other half were paired with
inanimate images (e.g., “made of wood”). Image and word pairings were
counterbalanced such that each word was paired with an animate image in one
version and an inanimate image in another. The number of words recalled on
an immediate recall test was the dependent variable.
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Materials
The same words in Experiment 2 were used in Experiment 3 with 4
exceptions: The words apple, flower, lemon, and potato were removed
because, although not animate, they are living things. The replacement words
were also drawn from the extended Pavio norms (Clark & Pavio, 2004). All
words were between three and seven letters long and were high in
concreteness (M = 6.90), familiarity (M = 6.13), and imagery (M = 6.54). For a
list of words and images used in Experiment 3, see Appendix C.
Procedure
The method of loci procedure of Experiment 1 was the same in
Experiment 3 with the main exception that subjects were given an image rather
than creating one themselves. In addition, Experiment 3 instructions were
modified to reduce the number of people who did not create a clear path. Also,
pilot data suggested that recall performance and output order were quite low
when subjects were instructed to write only the locations of the images along
their path. These pilot subjects reported focusing on identifying 30 locations in
their house rather than imagining placing the objects in those locations.
Therefore, the instructions in Experiment 3 were modified to emphasize that
the goal of the task was to imagine the given object interacting with the
subjects’ chosen location. The instructions also emphasized the importance of
creating a path. See Appendix D for the complete instructions. Subjects spent
on average 9.0 min in total for this task. Subjects were then given 4 min to
recall the words.
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Results
Initial Method of Loci Performance
Reaction times for animate and inanimate words were similar, Ms = 9.3
s vs. 8.8 s per word, t(59) = 1.79, d = 0.23, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.49].
Recall Performance
Figure 3 shows performance on the immediate recall test. Overall, there
was a numerical benefit for processing words as animates over processing
words as inanimates, Ms = 0.50 vs 0.46, t(59) = 1.54, d = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.06,
0.45], although this was not statistically significant.
All the intrusions, except for 2 words, were inanimate objects. The mean
number of intrusions was higher in this experiment (M = 1.03 intrusions per
subjects), but it was rare that subjects recalled a synonym of a word in place of
the actual word (M = 0.08 words per subject).
As in Experiment 2, another analysis was aimed at exploring recall
differences based on the number of animate characteristics of the images.
However, in the present experiment each subject did not create their own
animate images, but rather all subjects viewed the same 30 images, 15 of
which were animate. In the absence of a standardized norm of animate
characteristics, I used the same category of characteristics that were present in
the 1800 responses in Experiment 2 (listed in Table 2) to quantify the number
of animate characteristics of the images in Experiment 3. I then correlated the
average recall for the words associated with the 15 animate images with the
number of characteristics of the images. An increase in number of categories
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was associated with an increase in recall performance, but the result was not
significant r(14) = .23, p = .40.
Recall Output Order
The overall input-output correspondence and temporal factor in
Experiment 3 were similar as previous experiments, (Ms = 0.68, 0.65,
respectively) which demonstrate that subjects were indeed relying on some
sort of temporal organization during retrieval. The within-subject design allowed
me to perform an analysis similar to Experiment 1 to determine whether
subjects who recalled more animate than inanimate words relied more or less
on serial order. A large negative correlation between the subjects’ difference
scores and temporal scores would mean that subjects who demonstrated a
larger animacy effect depended less on serial order. As in previous
experiments, there were nonsignificant negative correlations with the AschEbenholtz input-output correlation, r(59)= -.24, p = .07 and the Polyn temporal
factor, r(59) = -.18, p = .18. In combination with results from Experiment 1,
these data suggest that using a temporal order may decrease the animacy
effect. As in previous experiments, the semantic factor was not statistically
different than chance, M = .48, t(59) = 0.97, p = .34, indicating that subjects
likely did not rely on animacy as a category cue during recall.
Bizarre Ratings
In Experiment 2 subjects created their own animate images which were
later rated as more bizarre and more difficult to imagine than inanimate
images. In the current Experiment, I created fixed images for subjects. To
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assess how bizarre and easy to imagine the images were, 60 subjects who had
not participated in Experiment 3 rated the bizarreness of the word-image pairs
and a separate 60 subjects rated the imagability of the word pairs. Each
subject rated all 30 words from either counterbalanced version. The rating
procedures were identical to Experiment 2. In typical free recall experiments,
bizarre images are more memorable than ordinary images, but only in mixed
list designs. However, in this experiment subjects were given a retrieval
strategy during encoding and retrieval and the subject was tasked with
retrieving the specific item. The prevailing explanation for the bizarreness effect
is that bizarre images enhance the retrievability of the specific item but not the
accessibility or discriminability of the individual items within the image
(McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). If that is the case, then it would be surprising if
bizarreness affected recallability of the words within the method of loci.
As in Experiment 2, the images created in the animate condition were
rated as more bizarre than the images created in the inanimate condition, Ms =
3.83 vs. 2.89, t(59) = 7.37, d = 0.95, 95%CI [0.64, 1.25]. The reverse pattern
was found for imagery ratings: The animate images were rated as more difficult
to imagine than the images in the inanimate condition, Ms = 2.57 vs. 3.76, t(59)
= 11.12, d = 1.43 95%CI [1.07, 1.79].
Discussion
In Experiment 3 subjects were given a mixed list of animate and
inanimate descriptions of objects and were asked to use the method of loci to
place the objects. In this within-subjects design, subjects recalled numerically
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more words associated with animate images than words associated with
inanimate images, yet this difference was not statistically significant. When
imagery was used to manipulate animacy, the animacy effect persisted. This
experiment also provides additional evidence that the animacy effect may be
decreased when subjects’ encoding strategy is restricted. Correlations between
subjects’ difference scores and output order were negative which suggests that
subjects who relied more on a temporal output order during retrieval had a
smaller animacy effect.
Objects associated with more animate characteristics may be more
memorable than objects associated with less animate characteristics, but these
differences were not detectable in this experiment, nor was this experiment
designed to detect such a difference. However, the results of the current
experiment trend in that direction. In fact, the phrase associated with the
highest recall (“crying because she is lonely”) had the highest number of
animate characteristics (4) and the phrase associated with the lowest recall
(“running in circles”) had only 1 characteristic.
The bizarre and imagery ratings from Experiment 3 replicated the
pattern found in Experiment 2. On one hand, bizarre images are typically
recalled more than ordinary objects in a mixed-list, free recall design. On the
other hand, imagability is another dimension that is considered one of best
predictors of recall performance (Rubin and Friendly, 1986). In the present
experiment, animate objects were both more bizarre and more difficult to
imagine.
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The results of Experiment 3 also allow for a brief comment about the
method of loci as a mnemonic tool. Looking across the free recall data from all
three experiments, the method of loci was less effective when subjects were
given the images and only asked to create locations. It is possible that part of
the benefit of the method of loci comes from creating images of the to-beremembered words.
Thus far, I have reported one experiment (Experiment 1) that
demonstrated the potent value of animacy as a mnemonic variable and two
experiments that provided weak evidence (Experiment 3) to no evidence
(Experiment 2) of the mnemonic value of pairing inanimate words with animate
images. Across these experiments, I have examined word type (animate vs.
inanimate) without directly stating the type of image that should be created,
and I have examined image type (animate vs. inanimate) with only inanimate
words. Experiment 4 was carried out as a further investigation of the
animate/inanimate word-image conditions previously used and also included a
fourth condition (animate words paired with inanimate images) that has not yet
been tested.
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EXPERIMENT 4
In Experiment 4, I first sought to conceptually replicate the effect of
animate words found in Experiment 1 and the smaller effect of animate images
found in Experiment 3. In addition, the previous experiments (Experiments 2
and 3) were concerned with the mnemonic benefits of adding animate
characteristics to inanimate words. In Experiment 4, I added a condition to
examine the mnemonic effects of removing animate characteristics from
animate words (see Figure 4 for an example from each condition). Specifically,
in this condition I paired animate words with inanimate images. Thus in
Experiment 4, I factorially crossed word type (animate vs. inanimate) with
image type (animate vs. inanimate). The procedure was identical to
Experiment 3: I provided subjects with images, half of which were animate and
half of which were inanimate. In contrast to Experiment 3, half of the
associated words were animate words and the other half were inanimate
words. Subjects were again told to image the word and associated
characteristic and to imagine placing the image along a path. Based on the
results from the previous experiments, I predicted a main effect of word and
image type such that more animate words and words that were paired with
animate images would be recalled than inanimate words and words paired with
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inanimate images. However, based on the results of Experiment 3, I predicted
that the effect of image type would be smaller than the effect of word type.
Method
Subjects
To determine the number of subjects, I performed a power analysis6
with the effect size from Experiment 3. Two hundred subjects (117 female, 77
male, and 6 people who did not identify their gender/reported “other”) were
recruited online via a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) posted on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. An additional 33 subjects were tested and excluded for the
following reasons: 2 subjects indicated cheating on the task, 1 subject left more
than 6 study response blank, 3 indicated using a smartphone, 9 subjects
reported computer/user errors, and 18 did not comply with instructions during
the method of loci task (1 subject retyped the word instead of creating an
image, 16 subjects were determined to be completely off task which included
responding to words with various locations across the world or putting all of the
words in the same location, and 1 subject reported being distracted by the TV
during the experiment and failed to understand the instructions). None of the
subjects in Experiment 4 had participated in the previous experiments. The
mean age of the subjects was 35.0 years (SD = 10.8, range = 19 - 67). The
same demographic information collection, post survey questionnaire and
worker restrictions from previous experiments were used (see Table 1).

6

Experiment 3 was chosen for the power analysis here because Experiment 4 contains a
direct replication of Experiment 3.

70
Design
A 2 (word type: animate vs. inanimate) X 2 (image type: animate vs.
inanimate) within-subjects design was used. Half of the words from the list
were paired with animate images (e.g., “trying to escape”) and the other half
were paired with inanimate images (e.g., “made of chocolate”). In addition, half
of the words were animate (e.g., “father”) and half were inanimate (e.g., “kite”).
There were 7 words in each of the 4 word-image conditions: (a) animateword/animate-image, (b) animate-word/inanimate-image, (c) inanimateword/animate-image, and (d) inanimate-word/inanimate-image. (See Figure 4
for the design and an example word-image pair for each condition.) Image and
word pairings were counterbalanced such that each word was paired with an
animate image in one counterbalance version and an inanimate image in
another. The number of words recalled on an immediate recall test was the
dependent variable.
Materials
Twenty-eight of the 30 words used in Experiment 1 were selected for
Experiment 4. This was done to create an equal number of words per
condition. For a list of words and images used in Experiment 4, see Appendix
C. Prior to Experiment 4, several pilot studies were done to create a set of
materials that had more similar bizarreness and imagery ratings than in
Experiment 3. The rating results from the 40 subjects who rated the
bizarreness (20 per version) and the 40 subjects who rated the imagery (20 per
version) are reported in Table 5.
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Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 3 with the exception that the
materials were different. Subjects spent on average 7.9 min in total for this
task. Subjects were given 4 min to recall the words.
Results
Initial Method of Loci Performance
A 2 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze the reaction
time. Subjects were faster at creating the location for animate words relative to
inanimate words, Ms = 16290 vs 17417, F(1, 196) = 4.03, ɳ2 = .02, p = .05.
Reaction times for animate and inanimate images were almost the same, Ms =
16.4 s vs 17.2 s, F(1, 196) = 1.21, ɳ2 = .01, p = .27. There was no interaction,
F(1, 196) = 1.10, ɳ2 = .01, p = .30.
Final Recall Performance
Figure 5 shows the performance on the immediate recall test. A 2 X 2
repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze recall performance. Overall
there was a main effect of word type, Ms = .54 vs .48, F(1, 199) = 21.27, ɳ2 =
.10, p < .001, and image type, Ms = .52 vs .49, F(1, 199) = 7.31, ɳ2 = .04, p =
.007, such that animate images were recalled better than inanimate images.
There was no interaction, F(1, 199) = 0.20, ɳ2 = .00, p = .66, indicating that the
effect of animate images did not differ when the images were paired with
animate words versus inanimate words.
Table 6 reports the average number of words recalled that were not on
the list. The mean number of intrusions was higher in Experiment 4 (M = 1.42
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intrusions per subject) than in previous experiments. More inanimate words
were intruded than animate words, M = 0.90 vs. M = 0.54. The majority of
intrusions were images (e.g., the subject recalled “chocolate”) most of which
were inanimate images, M = 0.55, whereas less were animate images, M =
0.06. Intrusions were further classified as synonyms of target words. Overall,
the pattern of these synonym intrusions followed the pattern of recall
performance: More animate synonyms were intruded than inanimate
synonyms, M = 0.18 vs. 0.10, and more synonyms associated with animate
images were intruded than synonyms associated with inanimate phrases, M =
0.17 vs. M = 0.11). In sum the higher intrusion rates in Experiment 4 were likely
due to a large number of image intrusions, the majority of which were
unexpectedly inanimate intrusions. Unsurprisingly, the intrusion pattern of
synonyms of target words followed the same pattern as the target word recall
performance.
Recall differences were again examined based on the number of
animate characteristics, collapsed across word type, of the images with a
correlation. However in this experiment, there was no relation between recall
and number of characteristics. If anything, an increase in number of categories
was associated with a slight decrease in recall performance, r(13) = -.15, p =
.61.
Bizarre/Imagery Ratings
The words and images used in Experiment 4 were rated in advance to
equate bizarreness and imagery across conditions. However, because there

73
were still small differences across conditions, these variables were correlated
with the average recall score for each word-image pair. There was a weak,
non-significant correlation between bizarre ratings and recall such that wordimage pairs that were rated as more bizarre were recalled less than words that
were rated as ordinary, r(54) = -0.06, p =.65. There was also a negative, yet
insignificant, correlation between image ratings and recall such that wordimage pairs that were rated as easier to image were recalled more than words
that were more difficult to image, r(54) = -0.15, p =.26. Bizarre imagery was not
associated with higher recall performance.
Recall Output Order
The overall input-output correspondence and temporal factor in
Experiment 4 were similar as previous experiments, (Ms = 0.66, 0.69) which
demonstrates that subjects were indeed relying on some sort of temporal
organization during retrieval. While there were no significant correlations
between the difference between animate and inanimate recall scores and the
output orders, there was a consistent negative trend for both words (AschEbenholtz: r = -0.05, p = .16; Temporal Factor: -0.05, p = .15) and images
(Asch-Ebenholt: r = -0.09, p = .19 Temporal Factor: -0.12, p = .08). In
combination with results from Experiments 1 and 3, these data suggest that
using a temporal order may decrease the animacy effect, although this was a
very small effect. As in the previous experiments, the semantic factor was at
chance, M = .50, t(196) = .353, p = .73, indicating subjects did not cluster their
recall responses based on semantic relatedness.
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Discussion
The results of Experiment 4 replicate the findings from Experiment 3
with inanimate words and extended the findings to include animate words. In
Experiment 4 subjects used the method of loci to learn a mixed list of animate
and inanimate words that were paired with either animate or inanimate images.
Subjects recalled more animate than inanimate words and recalled more words
that were paired with animate images than with inanimate images.
The results showed that manipulating the animacy of target words
produced a larger animacy effect than did manipulating the animacy of images.
When subjects processed an animate object as something that was inanimate
(e.g., “A minister sketched in pencil hangs over the doorway”) the animacy
characteristics still persisted. These objects were remembered just as well,
numerically even a bit better, than inanimate objects that acted like animates
(e.g., “The drum dances to its own beat in the shower”).
There was no obvious relationship between the number of animate
characteristics associated with each phrase and the recallability of the words
paired with those phrases. In fact, the phrase associated with the highest recall
(“trying to escape”) only had 1 animate characteristic whereas the phrase
associated with the lowest and second lowest recall (“dancing to music” and
“singing a song”) had 2 and 3 characteristics, respectively.
These data also provide additional insights into the usefulness of the
method of loci as a mnemonic device. The results provide support for the idea
expressed in Experiment 3 that the method of loci is more effective when
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people create their own images than when people are given images. In
Experiment 4, subjects recalled on average 51% (roughly 14 out of 28) words
whereas in Experiment 1, in which subjects were to create images however
they chose, subjects who used the method of loci recalled 68% (roughly 20 out
of 30) words. In addition to lower levels of recall performance, subjects in
Experiment 4 had higher intrusion rates and reported that it was difficult to
keep the images and words straight or that they focused too much on creating
location. One subject said, “I can remember something was writing a novel at
the kitchen table but not what exactly. Maybe it was a dove?” (It was not). Here
the subject successfully recalled part of the image (“writing a novel”), but failed
to remember the rest of the image (the target word “pencil”). Another subject
reported a similar confusion that was caused by the images, “I think if it wasn't
for the phrases, I would've been able to remember many more words.” Another
concluded, “If I do this type of thing again, I will ignore any given extra info and
only concentrate on word I need to remember and create images I need by
myself.”
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The reported experiments used the method of loci to explore the
mnemonic effects of animacy. The method of loci provided a salient
organizational strategy during encoding that was available again during
retrieval. As a result, output strategy was held constant across subjects so that
the recall test was a relatively pure measure of item information. In Experiment
1, memory for animate and inanimate words was tested in either the method of
loci or a pleasantness ratings control condition. Subjects learned a list of
words; half of the words were animate and the other half were inanimate.
Subjects in both conditions recalled more animate than inanimate words.
However, the animacy effect in the method of loci was smaller relative to the
pleasantness condition. These results demonstrated that the animacy effect
was smaller when subjects were given an ordered encoding and retrieval
structure, but animacy is still a potent variable in memory. In addition, subjects
in the method of loci condition recalled more words than did subjects in the
pleasantness control condition. Note the magnitude of this effect was rather
large, d = 1.60, 95%CI [1.24, 1.97].
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether the animacy effect persisted
when inanimate words were imagined as animate. All subjects were given a list
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of inanimate words. In the animate condition, subjects were told to imagine the
object was alive. In the inanimate condition, subjects were given no additional
instructions. In this between-subject design, there was no animacy effect. It is
unclear why there was no animacy effect in this experiment. Some possible
explanations include the between-subjects design, the difficulty of the task, or
the possibility that the animacy effect is limited to animate words and does not
extend to animate images. Given the results of the third and fourth
experiments, this last possibility is unlikely. These explanations will be
discussed in further detail below.
In Experiment 3, subjects saw inanimate words paired with
experimenter-generated images, half of which were animate and half of which
were inanimate. Subjects recalled numerically more words that were paired
with animate images than words that were paired with inanimate images,
although this effect was not statistically significant. A replication of Experiment
3 with more subjects was carried out in Experiment 4. In addition, I added a
condition to examine the mnemonic effects of removing animate characteristics
from animate words by pairing animate words with inanimate images. Thus, in
Experiment 4, I factorially crossed word type (animate vs. inanimate) with
image type (animate vs. inanimate). There was a main effect of both word type
and image type such that animate words were recalled more than inanimate
words (as in Experiment 1) and words associated with animate images were
recalled more than words associated with inanimate images (as in Experiment
3). The results of Experiment 4 demonstrate that imagining objects as
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animates, even if they are inanimate objects, produced an animacy effect.
Likewise, imagining animate objects as inanimate reduced the mnemonic value
of that word.
Why was there no advantage for animate imagery in Experiment 2? The
first obvious difference between Experiment 2 and Experiments 3 and 4 was
the use of a between-subjects design. To my knowledge, animacy effects have
yet to be seen in a pure list, between-subjects design. Certain memory
phenomena, such as the bizarreness or generation effects mentioned in this
manuscript, are only observed in mixed-list designs. It is possible that animacy
is another phenomenon that is only found in a mixed-list design. The
bizarreness and generation effects are thought to occur only in mixed list
designs because they either enhance the retrievability of the item at the cost of
the memory for the specific item or vice versa. In the generation effect, words
that are generated are presumably recalled more because those individual
words become more memorable at the cost of memory for the order
information. In a mixed-list, the order information of the restudied words is also
impaired due to the presence of the generated words within the list. In this
case, the order of both the generated and restudied words is impaired. In a
pure-list design, generating the words improves the item memory for the words
but impairs the order information. Restudying the words does not provide the
extra mnemonic boost at the individual item level, but it also does not impair
the order memory for the words, either. Thus, no generation effect is found in a
pure-list design (Nairne et al., 1991). Bizarreness is thought to improve
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memory for the opposite reasons. Words that are more bizarre are thought to
improve the retrievability of item at the cost of the memory for the specific item
(McDaniel & Einstein, 1986). Perhaps animacy is another phenomenon that
does not appear in a pure list design.
Another explanation of the null results in Experiment 2 is that the
animacy effect is not found with animate images of inanimate words. Across
three experiments, images were used to manipulate the animacy of objects
and Experiment 2 was the only experiment in which no effect was found
although in Experiment 4, the effect of imagery, d = .19, 95% CI [0.05, 0.33],
was smaller than the effect of animate words, d = .33, 95% CI [0.19, 0.47]. In
Experiment 2 a large proportion of animate images did not explicitly contain
animate imagery. Perhaps the combination of an already small imagery effect
and a large proportion of inanimate images included in the animate imagery
condition were sufficient to eliminate the animacy effect. Perhaps subjects in
Experiment 2 needed additional instructions or examples to learn how to use
the method of loci and create images a specific way.
In Experiment 4, creating animate images produced an animacy effect,
but this effect was smaller than the effect with animate words. When words
were paired with animate images, they were recalled more than when they
were paired with inanimate images and vice versa. It appears as though pairing
an animate word with an inanimate phrase reduced the mnemonic value of that
word relative to pairing the same word with an animate phrase. However,
animate words that were paired with inanimate images were still recalled more
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than inanimate words that were paired with animate images. There must be
something about animate words that is innately more memorable that cannot
be stripped away even if the animate characteristics of that word have been
stripped away.
Why was the animacy effect smaller with images relative to words? One
idea may be related to the number of animate characteristics in the image. This
is a possibility, but across all the experiment manipulating imagery type
(Experiments 2 - 4) there was no consistent relationship between the number
of animate characteristics associated with each phrase and the recallability of
the words paired with those phrases. In Experiment 2 the phrase associated
with the most characteristics, “crying because she is lonely”, was associated
with the highest recalled word but in Experiment 2, the words associated with
this phrase fell in the middle of the recall distribution. I think it is quite possible
that, in a separate and controlled experiment designed specifically to explore
this idea, objects with more animate characteristics or features may lead to
better recall. Such an experiment might pair more images (along the magnitude
of hundreds) that have been normed for the number of characteristics with
inanimate objects that are then tested on a final recall test. It is quite possible
that under these controlled and highly powered conditions, more animate
characteristics would predict higher recall scores. However, this is not a pattern
I have identified in the present experiments. Perhaps there are certain types of
animacy cues that may be more memorable than other cues. The exploratory
analysis in Experiment 2 did not reveal any support for this conclusion either,
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but again, I hesitate to dismiss the idea based on a conditional analysis of an
experiment with null results.
What mechanisms underlie the animacy effect? It is most likely that
animacy does not enhance exclusively item information or order information.
One possible explanation was that animates may capture attention and be
more memorable at the cost of the paired associate. The results of the present
experiments do not provide conclusive evidence one way or the other. On one
hand, these experiments provided a small amount of evidence that people with
larger animacy effects relied less on order (as seen from the consistently
negative correlations between subjects’ animacy effects and output order). This
fits with the idea that animates may have captured attention at the cost of the
associated location. During retrieval the locations associated with the animate
objects could have been less available than the locations associated with the
inanimate objects. This might explain the reduced output order for subjects with
larger animacy effects. On the other hand, the animacy effect persisted in the
method of loci, which means any impairment the location suffered was not
enough to eliminate the animacy effect. Importantly, the fact that the animacy
effect appeared in the method of loci at all suggests that the animacy effect is
due, at least in part, to memory for the items. Whether animates affect the
accessibility or order information of words is not fully known. The persistence of
the animacy effect in the method of loci also suggests it is unlikely that the
animacy effect occurs because subjects use “animate” and “inanimate” (or
“living” and nonliving”) as category cues during retrieval.
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Method of Loci
The use of the method of loci throughout these experiments allows for
some comments to be made about its effectiveness. While the primary goal of
this dissertation was not to examine the effectiveness of the method of loci per
se, there are several observations made across four experiments that are
worth noting. First, subjects in the method of loci condition recalled almost
twice as many words as subjects in the pleasantness control condition
(Experiment 1). Of course, these results are confounded by the total time on
task because subjects in the method of loci condition also spent about four
times as long for the initial encoding task. Nevertheless, the method of loci
produced impressive recall performance. Also, the goal of the present
experiments was to examine differences in memory for animate versus
inanimate objects. Therefore, I was not hoping for ceiling performance in the
method of loci conditions so that differences in the variable of interest would be
detectable. There are several changes that could be made that may boost
performance. One such change is that subjects in the present experiments
received relatively brief instructions. The memory athletes mentioned in this
manuscript have spent months, if not years, developing their method of loci
techniques. The subjects in this dissertation spent only minutes. Perhaps
performance would have been higher had subjects been given additional
instructions or practice opportunities. In previous studies examining the method
of loci, subjects participated in an entire session devoted to creating a path for
future use of the method. Currently, it is unknown whether a single session
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would improve performance or not, but I suspect it might. Additionally,
performance may improve if subjects are told explicitly to create an interactive
image with the to-be-remembered object and the location. Preliminary pilot
data suggest that this may improve performance. These interactive instructions
were intentionally excluded in Experiments 1 and 2 to keep performance from
ceiling.
Looking across all four experiments, it appears that method of loci
performance was best when subjects created their own images. In
Experiments 1 and 2, subjects created their own images. In Experiments 3 and
4, subjects viewed experimenter-created images. Comparing across these
experiments, method of loci performance was about 15% - 20% higher when
subjects created their own images. There were obvious differences across
conditions besides whether or not subjects created their own imagery, but
there are reasons to expect that self-generated images would be more
memorable than experimenter-generated images. Worthen and Hunt (2011)
reviewed several mnemonics and conclude that in general, self-generated
mnemonics are more effective than other-generated mnemonics. Perhaps with
additional training, people could learn to generate animate images themselves
that would be particularly memorable.
Finally, the results of these experiments do not provide overwhelming
evidence that bizarreness provides a mnemonic boost in the method of loci.
Bizarreness was not a factor of interest in these studies, but inanimate images
that were animated were consistently rated as more bizarre. This provided an
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opportunity to make some brief comments about bizarreness. In Experiment 2,
there were clear differences in bizarreness between the animate and inanimate
conditions yet no differences in performance. In Experiment 4, bizarreness
differences were minimized relative to Experiment 3 yet the same pattern of
recall was observed. It is unlikely that the animacy effect in these experiments
was driven by bizarre imagery.
Conclusion
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the animacy effect in
the method of loci. Across four experiments, there was evidence that the
animacy effect persisted in the method of loci both when animacy was
manipulated by the words themselves and with the imagery associated with the
words. However, the mnemonic effect of animacy was decreased in the
method of loci relative to a control (Experiment 1). Also, the animacy effect was
larger when the animacy manipulation occurred at the word level than when it
occurred at the image level. These results demonstrate that animacy is a
potent variable in memory.
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Pleasantness

77

Experiment 4

117

32

24

29

47

47

6

4

4

1

-

-

19 - 67

19 - 65

20 - 61

20 - 74

18 - 69

18 - 66

35 (10.8)

36.9 (11.6)

32.9 (9.4)

34.9 (10.6)

37.7 (11.9)

36.6 (12.3)

Note. Demographics are shown for subjects in all between group comparisons.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________

24

32

Inanimate

Experiment 3

30

Animate

Experiment 2

30

Method of Loci

Experiment 1

Males (N)
Females (N)
Gender Not Reported (N)
Age Range (years)
Average Age (years)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Demographics of Subjects in All Experiments

Table 1

Appendix A
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Table 2
Average Number of Intrusions Per Subject in Experiment 1
___________________________________________________________________________

Synonyms

Intrusions

___________________________________________________________________________

Animates

Inanimates

Animates

Inanimates

Method of Loci

0.35

0.12

0.05

0.12

Pleasantness

0.09

0.03

0.12

0.23

___________________________________________________________________________

Note. “Synonyms” are intrusions that were synonyms from the to-beremembered list (e.g. “dad” when the list word was “father” or “diary” instead of
“journal”). “Intrusions” are extra list intrusions that had no clear similarity to a
list word. Intrusions were also classified as either animate (e.g., “frog”) or
inanimate (e.g. “candle”). The pattern of synonyms was the same as the
pattern of recall performance. The opposite pattern was found for extra list
intrusions: More inanimates were intruded than animates.

Recall

"tap dancing"; "turning its own pages"; "rocking himself slowly"

0.26

0.66

"looking for bugs in the dirt"; "trying to cook itself on the heat radiating

"Playing a tuba all night long"; "Sweeping the lint off an old sweater";

"hitting on the lemon with corny pick up lines"; "calling everyone

and wearing an eye patch"; "Sitting at the vanity, tweezing it's

"A huge, man sized flower, a daisy with a face"; "the apple is squinting

(table continues)

eyebrows"
0.02
0.63
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Has a face

Emotion
"crying"; "Potato sprouting with pride"; "feeling crowded"
0.04
0.68
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

names"; "saying, 'Look! It's rock and bowl!!'"
0.05
0.70
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Using language

"Doing push-ups"
0.15
0.60
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Human-like behavior

goal
up from the asphalt"; "trying to keep cool"
0.22
0.67
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Planning or pursuing a

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Self-generated movement

Example Response
Animate Images
Performance
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Proportion of

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Classification of Animate Descriptions

Table 3
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Recall

laughing at me because I'm wearing a dress"; "holding the dollar down

(cause and effect)

"being smothered under the vaccuum"; "Metal snakes"; "dripping with

and trampled"; "I look at the top of the fridge and see an old, yellowed,

"purple and covering the whole step"; "a rose, crushed on the floor

"My dress clings to my body as I stroll through my house"; "tripped

"My rock waterfall trickles water down into my pool"; "Coffee spilling on

generated movement) to lease common (growing). The proportion of recall associated with each characteristic is in the far right column.

Note. Characteristics of animate objects from responses in the Animate condition. Characteristics are in order from most common (self-

floor"; "falling off the edge"
0.06
0.73
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Physical movement

over slipper"; "I grab my wallet and a ticket stub falls out "
0.11
0.71
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Acted on by an animate

dried apple. Hhmm.. better throw that away."
0.38
0.68
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Not animate/ambiguous

Growing
"growing itself"; "growing though the cracks on the ground"
0.004
0.38
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

sweat."
0.006
0.73
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Other animate

so he doesn't blow away"
0.02
0.70
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

"crying because no one here really love him"; "… [the pencils] start

Contingent behavior

Example Response
Animate Images
Performance
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Proportion of

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 4
Average Number of Intrusions Per Subject in Experiment 2
_____________________________________________

Synonyms

Intrusions

_____________________________________________

Animate

0.35

0.35

Inanimate

0.32

0.23

_____________________________________________

Note. All intrusions were inanimate words. “Animate” and “Inanimate” here
designate the image condition (whether subjects were instructed to create
animate images or not). The pattern of synonyms was the same as the pattern
of recall performance. Subjects in the Animate condition intruded more than did
subjects in the Inanimate condition.
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Table 5
Bizarreness and Image Ratings for Experiments 2-4
____________________________________________________________________

Animate Image

Inanimate Image

____________________________________________________________________

Experiment 2
Bizarreness

3.28 (0.05)

2.63 (0.09)

Imagery

2.88 (0.10)

3.62 (0.07)

Bizarreness

3.83 (0.12)

2.89 (0.06)

Imagery

2.57 (.14)

3.76 (0.08)

3.23 (0.07)

3.03 (0.09)

3.56 (0.14)

3.30 (0.10)

3.33 (0.13)

3.30 (0.15)

2.96 (0.15)

3.08 (0.14)

Experiment 3

Experiment 4
Bizarreness
Animate Word
Inanimate
Word
Imagery
Animate Word
Inanimate
Word

____________________________________________________________________

Note. Bizarreness ratings were made by independent raters on a scale from of
1-5 where 1 was very normal and 5 was very bizarre. Imagery ratings were
made on a scale from 1-5 where 1 was very difficult to image and 5 was very
easy to image.
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Table 6
Average Number of Intrusions Per Subject in Experiment 4
__________________________________________________________________

Synonyms
Animate Words

Inanimate Words

__________________________________________________________________

Animate Images

0.11

0.06

Inanimate Images

0.07

0.04

__________________________________________________________________

Intrusions
Animates

Inanimates

__________________________________________________________________

Word Intrusions

0.30

0.25

Image Intrusions

0.06

0.55

__________________________________________________________________

Note. The pattern of synonyms was the same as the pattern of recall
performance. Extra list intrusions were also classified as word
intrusions that had no similarity to the to-be-remembered list and
image intrusions which were intrusions of images that were
associated with the to-be-remembered words. The most common
intrusion of this sort were inanimate images (e.g., recalling
“chocolate” which was part of the image “made of chocolate”).
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Appendix B

Recall Performance
0.8
Animate Word
Inanimate Word

Proportion correct

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.72

0.63

Method of Loci

0.49

0.27

Pleasantness

Figure 1. Recall performance in Experiment 1. Animate words were recalled
more than inanimate words. Subjects in the method of loci condition recalled
more than did subjects in the pleasantness ratings condition. Error bars are
standard error of the mean.
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Recall Performance
0.8

Proportion Correct

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.68
Animate

0.67
Inanimate

Figure 2. Recall performance in Experiment 2. There was no clear benefit for
processing words as animates over processing words as inanimates. Error
bars are standard error of the mean.

111

Recall Performance
0.8

Proportion Correct

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.50

0.46

Animate

Inanimate

Figure 3. Recall performance in Experiment 3. Words associated with animate
images were recalled more than words associated with inanimate images.
Error bars are standard error of the mean.
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Recall Performance
0.8
Animate Image
Inanimate Image

Proportion correct

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.55

0.52

Animate Word

0.50

0.47

Inanimate Word

Figure 5. Recall performance in Experiment 4. Animate words and words
associated with animate images were recalled more than inanimate words and
words associated with inanimate images. Error bars are standard error of the
mean.
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Appendix C
Materials Used in Experiments
Experiment 1

Familiarity
Imagery
KF-Freq
No.Letters
Meaning-C
Concreteness
Category
Size
Typicality
AoA
Relatedness

Animate
baby
bee
duck
engineer
father
goat
judge
minister
owl
python
soldier
spider
trout
turtle
wolf

Inanimate
doll
drum
hat
journal
kite
nickel
pearl
pencil
purse
rake
slipper
stove
tent
violin
whistle

Animate
510 (67)
590 (37)
35.1 (48)
5.27 (1.6)
452 (58)
590 (36)

Inanimate
516 (38)
580 (28)
16.5 (16)
5.13 (1.3)
435 (31)
594 (16)

21.7 (6.1)

22.1 (5.8)

.224 (.21)
277 (97)
.106 (.24)

.235 (.17)
288 (99)
.123 (.24)
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Experiment 2
wine
toy
toast
ticket
star
slipper
ship
rock
potato
pipe
pencil
nail
lemon
jelly
gold
fork
flower
dress
dollar
diamond
coin
coffee
cigar
car
candy
bowl
bottle
book
arrow
apple
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Experiment 3
Words
book
bottle
candy
car
chair
cigar
diamond
dress
flag
fork
gold
pipe
rock
ticket
wine

toast
toy
coin
nail
piano
ship
arrow
jelly
hammer
bowl
dollar
coffee
star
pencil
slipper

Animate Image
trying to get a tan
dancing to music
standing guard
crying because she is lonely
doing push ups
flirtatiously batting her eyes
plugging his nose
laughing hysterically
running in circles
playing tennis
has the flu
sticking his tongue out
humming a song
praying on his knees
trying to escape

Inanimate image
changing colors
falling from above
made of wood
covered in dirt
shiny and new
faded from the sun
wrapped in green paper
old and molding
glowing in the dark
hot pink and fuzzy
rotten and decaying
covered in dust
painted in blood
melting in a puddle
on fire
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Experiment 4
Animate
Word
baby
bee
goat
owl
wolf
duck
father
trout
turtle
minister
python
engineer
judge
spider

Inanimate
Word
nickel
stove
violin
doll
pearl
pencil
kite
drum
whistle
rake
hat
tent
slipper
journal

Animate Image
running in circles
wants to eat dinner
singing a song
is in love
flirtatiously batting her eyes
is writing a novel
trying to escape
dancing to music
standing guard
crawling towards me
wants to go outside
shaking because he is cold
has a goofy grin
crying because she is lonely

Inanimate Image
carved out of wood
framed oil painting
made of silver
forged of metal
limited edition playset
chiseled of stone
made of chocolate
made of plastic
folded out of paper
sketched in pencil
a keychain
a sculpture
made of cheese
a toy
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Appendix D
Instructions used in the experiments
Experiment 1
In this task you will learn how to memorize a list of 30 words. To do this,
you will imagine walking through a house – perhaps your childhood home –
and placing each item in a different location. You’ll place the items along a
familiar path so that later you will be able to mentally retrace your steps and
“pick up” the items you originally placed there. Some locations could be your
driveway, front door, a chair in the living room, and so on. You may place a few
items in the same room, but try your best to create a path.
Try to create a rich image of each word. For example, you might see the
word PEACH. You would imagine placing the PEACH on the driveway of your
house. To create a rich image of the PEACH, you might imagine that the
PEACH is so large that it is blocking you from the driveway.
Next you might see the word BALL. You would want to imagine placing
the BALL in the next location along the path through your house such as the
hallway. You might then imagine that the BALL is painted in blood. Imagine
that the blood is dripping from the BALL and onto the hallway floor.
You will see the word in capital letters and two boxes. Your job is to type
the location in the box labeled “location” and briefly describe the image in the
box labeled “image”. For example, if you saw “PEACH”, you would type:
Location: front door step
Image: blocking the front door
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Experiment 2
Instructions in Experiment 2 were the same as Experiment 1 with the exception
that the examples included animate examples for the animate conditions. The
italics are added to show the differences in the animate compared to the
inanimate examples. Subjects did not see italics.
Animate condition:
To create a rich image of the PEACH, you might imagine that the
PEACH is angrily trying to block you from the driveway. When imagining the
objects, imagine that they are alive.
Next you might see the word BALL. You would want to imagine placing
the BALL in the next location along the path through your house such as the
front door. You might then imagine that the BALL is painting himself with blood.
Imagine that the blood is dripping from the BALL and on the front door.
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Experiment 3 & 4
In this task you will learn how to memorize a list of 30 words. To do this,
you will create an image of each word you see. Next you will imagine walking
through a house – perhaps your childhood home – and placing each word in a
different location along a path through the house. You’ll place the images of the
words along a familiar path so that later you will be able to mentally retrace
your steps and “pick up” the items you originally placed there. You will be
asked to type each location you choose. Don’t worry if the items do not
naturally belong in the location on your path. The goal is to place the items
along a path and NOT to put items where you might typically find them. Next
you will see an example of locations along a path.
For example, the path through your house might start on the driveway.
The first word would go on the driveway. After your driveway, you might
imagine walking up to your front door. The second item would go by the front
door. From there you might walk through the front door to a chair in the living
room. Therefore, your first three locations would be (1) your driveway, (2) front
door, (3) a chair in the living room, and so on. To really remember the words,
you will want to create a mental picture of the item interacting with the location.
(You will see an example soon.) You may place a few items in the same room
(for example, the kitchen table, the kitchen sink or the fridge), but try your best
to create a path.
In addition to seeing a word, you will see a description of the word and a
box to type the location. For example, you might see the word PEACH. The
PEACH is described as being very large. Your job is to imagine the large
PEACH at your first location of your path, such as the driveway.
When you write your location, describe the location and how your image
is interacting with your location. For this example you would want to type:
Location: The peach is so large that it is blocking me from
entering my DRIVEWAY.
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Recall Instructions (all Experiments)
Now we would like to see if you remember the words you saw. To
remember the words, imagine yourself walking through the locations in your
house and remembering the words you placed there.
We would like you to recall only the names of the objects you saw. For
example, if you imaged a PEACH blocking the front door step, you will ONLY
write “peach”. You will NOT write anything else for this word.
Please do not cheat or open other tabs or browsers during the
experiment. We will not be able to use your data if you have cheated.
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